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Human beings should live in places where they are most productive,
and megacities, where information, innovation, and opportunities
congregate, would be the optimal choice. Yet megacities in both China and
the United States are excluding people by limiting the housing supply. Why,
despite their many differences, is the same type of exclusion happening in
both Chinese and U.S. megacities? Urban law and policy scholars argue
that Not-In-My-Back-Yard (“NIMBY”) homeowners are taking over
megacities in the U.S. and hindering housing development. They pin their
hopes on an efficient growth machine that makes sure “above all, nothing
gets in the way of building.” Yet the growth-dominated megacities of China
demonstrate that relying on business and political elites to provide
affordable housing is a false hope. Our comparative study of the
homeowner-dominated megacities of the U.S. and growth-dominated
megacities of China demonstrates that the origin of exclusionary
megacities is not a choice between growth elites and homeowners, but the
exclusionary nature of property rights. Our study reveals that megacities in
the two countries share a property-centered approach, which prioritizes
the maximization of existing property interests and neglects the interests of
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the ultimate consumers of housing, resulting in housing that is
unaffordable. Giving housing consumers a voice in land use control and
urban governance becomes the last resort to counteract this result. This
comparative study shows that the conventional triangular framework of
land use—comprising government, developers, and homeowners—is
incomplete, and argues for a citizenship-based approach to urban
governance.
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INTRODUCTION
“To add 45 feet, no matter what you put in it—you could put Mother
Theresa in it—it still is a too-tall building.”
—Elizabeth Ashby, Co-Chair, Manhattan Community Board1
“[S]trengthen the population control targets through land supply”
—Outline of Shanghai Master Plan (2015–2040)2

Human beings should live in places where they are most productive,
and megacities, 3 where information, innovation, and opportunities
congregate, would be the optimal choice.4 Yet megacities in both China
and the United States are excluding people by limiting housing supply. In
the U.S., New York City “has lost a net 529,000 domestic migrants” from
2010 to 2015, in large part due to its high housing costs.5 In San Francisco,
housing production has long failed to match the city’s economic growth,
with only 11,000 units added to its housing stock from 2009 to 2015, a
period in which the city added over 123,000 new jobs. 6 In China, city
governments in both Beijing and Shanghai have reduced the supply of
residential land to control population, resulting in reduced speed of
population growth in Beijing and population outflow in Shanghai since
2016.7
1. Abigail Savitch-Lew, How Are NYC’s Community Boards Reacting to de Blasio’s Housing
Proposals?, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 2, 2015), http://citylimits.org/2015/11/02/how-are-nycs-communityboards-reacting-to-de-blasios-housing-proposals.
2. “以用地供给强化人口调控目标，以产业结构调整优化人口结构，以适宜的人口密度调
节人口分布” [“To strengthen the population control targets through land supply; to optimize the
population structure through readjustment of the industrial structure; to regulate the population
distribution through appropriate population density.”]. See LEADING GROUP OFFICE OF SHANGHAI
MASTER PLAN, 上海市城市总体规划 (2015–2040）纲要概要 [OUTLINE OF SHANGHAI URBAN
MASTER PLAN (2015–2040)] 11 (2015), http://img.thupdi.com/news/2016/01/1453791519864576.pdf.
3. “Megacity” is a term widely used and accepted but rarely precisely defined. In this Article,
we use the term to refer to first-tier cities in China, represented by Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen,
and the biggest cities in the U.S., represented by New York City and San Francisco.
4. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY (2011).
5. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, The Cities Americans Are Thronging to and Fleeing, FORBES (Oct. 6,
2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2015/10/06/the-cities-americans-arethronging-to-and-fleeing.
6. BAY AREA COUNCIL ECON. INST., SOLVING THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CRISIS: HOW
POLICIES CHANGE THE NUMBER OF SAN FRANCISCO HOUSEHOLDS BURDENED BY HOUSING COSTS 5
(2016), http://www.bayareaeconomy.org/files/pdf/BACEI_Housing_10_2016.pdf [hereinafter HOUSING
AFFORDABILITY].
7. See, e.g., 何苗 [He Miao], 外来常住人口首现 15 万净流出：谁离开了上海？[150,000 Net
Outflow of Migrant Permanent Resident Population: Who Leaves Shanghai?], 21 JINGJI (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2016-03/02/content_33343.htm; 北京楼市，真的遭遇大利空了吗？
[Is the Real Estate Market in Beijing Running out of Interests?], IFENG NEWS (Feb. 28, 2017, 6:17 PM),
http://wemedia.ifeng.com/9158923/wemedia.shtml; 李迅雷 [Lee Thunder], 人口流向出现逆转，它将

470

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

Why, despite their many differences, is the same type of exclusion
happening in these two countries? The two countries are fundamentally
different in land ownership regimes, land use regulations, and urban
governance. Urban law and policy scholars in the U.S. are concerned that
Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) homeowners are taking over big cities
and hindering housing development therein, thereby excluding lowerincome and younger populations from the opportunities that those cities
offer.8 Explicit or implicit in their research is hope for an efficient growth
machine that makes sure “above all, nothing gets in the way of building.”9
From an American perspective, growth-oriented elites in cities, including
land developers and urban politicians, profit through the increasing
intensification of land us10 Governments in Chinese megacities monopolize
land supply, manipulate land use controls, and centralize decision-making
processes to promote growth. Such governments would be an ideal for the
above American urban law and policy scholars. If their theory about the
urban growth machine was correct, however, there should have been no
housing shortage in super growth-focused cities in China. Why do
megacities in China also limit housing supply?
Our comparative study of the homeowner-dominated megacities of the
U.S. 11 and growth-dominated megacities of China 12 demonstrates that
对中国经济产生怎样的影响？[How Will the Phenomenon of Reverse Population Flow Affect the
Economy in China?], SOHU (Apr. 25, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://www.sohu.com/a/136422828_481642.
8. See generally Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking
the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 227 (2014); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David
Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81 (2011) [hereinafter Hills &
Schleicher, Balancing]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101
IOWA L. REV. 91 (2015) [hereainafter Hills & Schleicher, Planning]; John Mangin, The New
Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91 (2014); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122
YALE L.J. 1670 (2013); Urban Land: Space and the City, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647614-poor-land-use-worlds-greatest-cities-carries-hugecost-space-and-city (“Lifting all the barriers to urban growth in America could raise the country’s GDP
by between 6.5% and 13.5%, or by about $1 trillion–2 trillion.”); Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of
Econ. Advisers, Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents,
Remarks at the Urban Institute (Nov. 20, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/
files/page/files/20151120_barriers_shared_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf.
9. Edward L. Glaeser, Houston, New York Has a Problem, CITY J., https://www.cityjournal.org/html/houston-new-york-has-problem-13102.html (Summer 2008). See Been et al., supra
note 8; Hills & Schleicher, Balancing, supra note 8; Schleicher, supra note 8. On the other hand,
scholars are also concerned about local governments being captured by mobile capital. See generally
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123
HARV. L. REV. 482 (2009).
10. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy
of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976).
11. See, e.g., William A. Fischel, The Rise of Homevoters: How OPEC and Earth Day Created
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relying on business and political elites to provide affordable housing is a
false hope. Homeowners do not generally look favorably on newcomers to
a city who demand housing and public services, but do not have
sufficiently deep pockets to purchase an apartment. Neither do growthoriented city governments that control resources and have the capacity to
make and implement whatever policies they deem to be pro-growth. This
Article argues that the growth-machine-versus-homevoter13 debate shares
the same incomplete framework of urban governance, giving no voice to
city residents who own no property or businesses, and it calls for citizenbased urban governance to replace property-based urban governance. The
Article also furthers that debate by comparing land use controls and
development processes in the U.S. and China. At first glance, the two
countries appear fundamentally different in the way they approach such
issues.
In the U.S., land use decisions have a democratic basis and involve
numerous parties, including neighboring property owners, community
advocates, appointed and elected officials, and real estate developers.
Although many groups engage in the decision-making process, as housing
costs in many American cities have increased in recent years, policymakers
have become concerned that the end result is restrictive zoning rules that
limit mobility and exacerbate income inequality. 14 Many community
advocates have expressed concern that local zoning decision-making
processes are complex, inefficient, and lacking in transparency, and, as a
result, they prevent needed development. 15 Zoning amendments, a major
step in real estate development, have frequently been locked into what
David Schleicher and Roderick Hills call “one by one” piecemeal
bargaining, dominated by NIMBY property owners.16
China presents a very different picture of land use control. There, land
Growth-Control Zoning that Derailed the Growth Machine, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN
HOUSING LAW AND POLICY 13 (Lee Anne Fennell & Benjamin J. Keys eds., 2017); Been et al., supra
note 8; Schleicher, supra note 8.
12. See generally Xiaoyi Sun & Ronggui Huang, Extension of State-Led Growth Coalition and
Grassroots Management: A Case Study of Shanghai, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 917 (2016); Lei Wang,
Forging Growth by Governing the Market in Reform-Era Urban China, 41 CITIES 187 (2014); Lin Ye,
State-Led Metropolitan Governance in China: Making Integrated City Regions, 41 CITIES 200 (2014);
Sumei Zhang, Land-Centered Urban Politics in Transitional China—Can They Be Explained by
Growth Machine Theory?, 41 CITIES 179 (2014).
13. For a discussion of the term “homevoter,” see infra text accompanying note 47.
14. Furman, supra note 8.
15. Mangin, supra note 8.
16. Schleicher, supra note 8 at 1706–07.
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use regulations are administratively driven.17 The general public has only
nominal rights to participate in the zoning process. Land use power is
concentrated at the city administration level under the command of a strong
city leader. As a result, city governments can make zoning amendments
quickly, with little input from the public.18 However, the Chinese central
government, urban planning officials, professionals, and scholars have
exposed significant problems within this “efficient” system and argued that
the lack of public participation is endangering the legitimacy of zoning in
China and contributing to an inefficient housing market.19 The Chinese real
estate market exhibits a combination of skyrocketing prices in the country’s
megacities, which results in the exclusion of middle- and low-income
populations (as well as the denial of employment and social opportunities)
and housing oversupply in its smaller cities, as symbolized by the
numerous “ghost cities” dotting the landscape.20 In this Article, we focus
on housing shortages in Chinese and American megacities.
Although there are major differences between the Chinese and
American land use systems, they share the phenomenon of high housing
prices becoming a new instrument by which to exclude poorer populations
from megacities. China’s megacities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and
Shenzhen, have seen demand outpace net new construction since the turn
17. See infra Part III.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Ye, supra note 12 at 189–90. See generally 罗鹏飞 [Luo Pengfei], 关于城市规划
公众参与的反思及机制构建 [Reflections on the Public Participation in Urban Planning and Its
Mechanism Construction], 6 城市问题 [URB. PROBLEMS] 32 (2012).
20. A defining characteristic of the Chinese housing market is the undersupply of housing in
megacities and oversupply of housing in smaller cities. See generally Jing Wu et al., Evaluating the
Risk of Chinese Housing Markets: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 39 CHINA ECON. REV.
91 (2016). Looking at the bigger picture of nationwide housing demand and supply, both China and the
U.S. share a mismatch between housing supply and job opportunities. “[L]ocal governments with the
weakest economies have been the most aggressive in promoting new housing supply, perhaps as a
means of generating economic growth, while local governments in the richest cities have been slowing
down construction.” Edward Glaeser et al., A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics, 31 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 98 (2017). See also Hanming Fang et al., Demystifying the Chinese Housing Boom,
30 NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 2015 105, 152–53 (“There is still a lack of systematic
understanding of housing supply in Chinese cities. To the extent that housing prices have been rising at
a pace comparable to or even higher than the households’ income growth rate during the decade, the
housing market equilibrium implies that the growth of housing supply was likely to have stayed either
below or comparable to the growth of housing demand . . . .”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao,
Voice and Exit as Accountability Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese
Communist Party?, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 168–69 (2017); Mali Chivakul et al.,
Understanding Residential Real Estate in China 18 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/84,
2015) (“For China, Tier I cities are close to the average levels in advanced economies, while smaller
cities already see a much higher level, suggesting possible signs of oversupply.”).
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of the century.21 According to joint research by Joe Gyourko, Yongheng
Deng, and Jing Wu, from 2001 to 2014, the housing supply was just 87%
of projected demand in Beijing, 70% in Shanghai, and 73% in Shenzhen.22
In the U.S., there are more than two “extremely low income and very low
income households” for every one housing unit affordable to them in New
York City.23 The lack of affordable housing in San Francisco has pushed
families out of the job market and the city.24 In both the U.S. and China,
procedural obstacles and the biases of (public and private) property owners
are obstructing housing development and reinforcing real estate
developers’ inherent inclination toward the construction of expensive
housing. The result is a limited supply of new construction, which, when
combined with continued demand growth from new residents, has led to
significant increases in the cost of housing in megacities. 25 Traditional
exclusionary zoning approaches have been used to keep certain populations
out of attractive communities and to prevent them from accessing decent
affordable housing. For example, racial covenants were used in the U.S.
until after the Second World War,26 and the hukou residency registration
system has a long history in China.27 As exclusionary policies came under
attack in the U.S., more subtle forms of regulatory exclusion took hold in
the suburbs, the types of processes that led to the Mount Laurel decisions
and government intervention.28 In the twenty-first century, traditional forms
of exclusionary zoning continue, and cities are witnessing a growth in
21. Wu et al., supra note 20, at 5–6.
22. See id. at 60 (“Market-level analysis of short- and longer-run changes in supply-demand
balances finds important variation across markets. In the major East region markets of Beijing,
Hangzhou, Shanghai and Shenzhen which have experienced very high rates of real price growth, we
estimate that the growth in households demanding housing units has outpaced new construction since
the turn of the century. However, there are a dozen large markets, primarily in the interior of the
country, in which new housing production has outpaced household growth by at least 30% and another
eight in which it did so by at least 10%.”). Id. at 2.
23. Our Current Affordable Housing Crisis, N.Y.C. HOUSING, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/
housing/problem/problem.page (last visited July 4, 2017).
24. HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, supra note 6, at 4.
25. Furman, supra note 8, at 5–6. As discussed in Part IC, the richest cities are often megacities
which occupy unique and monopoly positions on the market of places, and, therefore, tend to
undersupply housing to grab monopoly rents.
26. See, e.g., RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013).
27. See generally FEI-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION AND EXCLUSION: CHINA’S
HUKOU SYSTEM (2005).
28. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 21–23 (2013). See also S.
Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty.
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).

474

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

obstacles to new development through the processes described in this
Article.29 It is particularly surprising to see such obstacles in China, where,
despite driving the world’s most effective growth machine over the past
three decades, housing prices in the country’s megacities have skyrocketed.
Why have two such different land use regimes led to a similar form of
exclusion? We argue that, despite their different decision-making
processes, the development regimes of both countries share an urban
governance framework that neglects the voices of the have-nots and is
premised on the drive to maximize the value of land for current owners,
thereby leading to discrimination against the interests of middle- and lowincome populations.30 We use the Chinese case to demonstrate that, even in
super-growth-focused cities, decision-making can lead to exclusion if the
politics of urban governance are centered on land value maximization for
current owners. The root cause of exclusionary cities is urban governance
regimes that prioritize property owners’ interests and voices, at the core of
which lies the right to exclude. A fundamental lesson is that urban
governance is not only about land or capital, 31 but also about labor and
housing consumers, the neglect of whose interests leads to inefficiency and
exclusion.
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part I lays out
the basic differences of property and political markets between Chinese and
American megacities and reveals that despite fundamental differences in
land institutions and urban governance, landowners dominate both markets;
housing consumers’ voices are weak or zero in both kinds of megacities.
Part II examines the origin and structure of zoning in American megacities,
focusing on the growth-machine-versus-homevoter hypothesis, exploring
the ways in which zoning processes have become increasingly contested
and the impact of conflicts over development in American megacities.
Drawing on the example of New York City, it then demonstrates that even
in megacities where developers would be expected to have influence,
property owners dominate zoning processes, leading to the exclusion of
middle- and low-income populations. Part III examines urban governance
in Chinese megacities, revealing an alliance between government and
developers, as well as the growing influence of property owners. We argue

29. Mangin, supra note 8, at 92.
30. This paper does not address the relationship between city governments and upper-level
governments, which can impact housing supply too. See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home
Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003).
31. Schragger, supra note 9, at 485.
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that this alliance has led to skyrocketing prices in Chinese megacities,
which exclude middle- and low-income populations. The Chinese case
reveals that growth-machine elites’ interests are not necessarily in alliance
with a greater housing supply. Finally, Part IV concludes by examining the
convergence of both American and Chinese megacities towards exclusion
and proposes to replace the current property-centered urban governance
with a citizenship-based approach to make megacities more affordable and
inclusive.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING LAND USE IN TWO MEGACITIES:
PROPERTY AND POLITICAL MARKETS
In both the United States and China, supply and demand decide the
final land use, and land institutions (i.e., land ownership regimes and land
use regulations) shape both supply and demand. Therefore, to
conceptualize land use in China and the U.S., we need to understand not
only their property markets, but also the political markets of urban
governance. The most interesting aspect of this comparison is that, despite
fundamental differences in land institutions and urban governance,
landowners dominate both markets, and consumers’ voices are weak in
both Chinese and American megacities. More specifically, American
megacity politics are dominated by existing property owners, whereas in
Chinese megacities, the government, as the sole land owner, prioritizes
industrial development and favors high housing prices over satiating
demand. As a result, land use processes in both China and the U.S.
prioritize property owners’ voices and neglect the needs and demands of
the have-nots and newcomers to big cities.
A. PROPERTY MARKET: STATE MONOPOLY VS. HOMEOWNERS’
MONOPOLY
In China, city governments monopolize land supply and are
incentivized to undersupply residential land to grab monopoly rents from
consumers. In U.S. cities, the real estate industry is much more
competitive. Yet, with the institution of zoning, the supply of housing can
be restricted by monopolistic practices. Empirical studies have shown that
such monopolistic supply restriction is widespread., originally in suburbs
and now even in megacities. In other words, since “zoning power within an
urban area is sufficiently concentrated” amongst local homeowners and
their representatives, the “supply of housing [in such areas has been] below
[optimal], and its price above, those which would prevail in competitive
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equilibrium with no zoning.”32 State and homeowner monopolies over the
property market are the defining characteristic of land use in China and the
U.S., respectively. We can proceed to more detailed description of the two
systems with this defining characteristic established.
To compare land use approaches in China and the U.S., it is necessary
to clarify the concept of zoning and, more fundamentally, the function of
land use regulations. Each society’s understanding of property rights is
crucial to its conception of zoning, and China and the U.S. differ greatly in
their fundamental understanding of both property rights and zoning. The
historic understanding of property rights in the U.S is captured by the
phrases “the title of our lands is free, clear, and absolute” 33 and “every
proprietor of land is a prince in his own domain.”34 In other words, private
property owners have wide latitude in determining the uses of their
property. Although property ownership has always been subject to
government regulation in the U.S., the libertarian view captured by the
foregoing phrases has shaped the legal rules governing the strength of
private property rights and the limited role of the government in
determining those rights. The primary justification for zoning in the U.S.,
as represented by the Euclid decision, is the need to prevent negative
externalities that may result from individual land use decisions.35 The goal
of the zoning rules developed to regulate land use was to prevent any
interference with the rights of neighboring property owners: i.e., the
government plays the role of regulator to protect private property
interests.36 However, the problem with a land use system based on private
property rights is that “housing owners can employ growth controls to
cartelize housing supply.”37 “If consumer demand for residency in a [place]
is not completely elastic,” which is always the case in megacities,
homeowners’ interests are allied with limiting housing supply to maintain

32. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. URB. ECON. 116, 116
(1978). See also William A. Fischel, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power: A Reevaluation, 8 J.
URB. ECON. 283 (1980); James A. Thorson, An Examination of the Monopoly Zoning Hypothesis, 72
LAND ECON. 43 (1996).
33. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 5
(2011).
34. Id.
35. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926).
36. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Conceptual Approach to Zoning: What's Wrong with Euclid,
5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 286–87 (1996).
37. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE
L.J. 385, 400 (1977).
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or even increase the market value of existing housing.38
In contrast, local governments in China are the primary land owners
and suppliers within their jurisdictions. Zoning is a recent concept, adopted
as part of the country’s market reforms. Historically, the government has
controlled land directly through ownership. 39 Urban planning is a more
commonly used term than zoning in China, and it follows the economic
planning tradition. It is a powerful weapon for local governments to
achieve their city management objectives. In the planned economy period,
land use decisions were part of development decisions.40 The central and
local governments formulated five-year economic development plans,
implemented through a variety of projects. The governments controlled the
plans for such projects, including their locations, how much land to use,
and what facilities needed to be built. Hence, land use decisions were not
independent, but rather part of, and inferior to, overall project decisions.41
The strength of such economic plans was the centralized decisionmaking process, whereby the government determined the appropriate land
use and made decisions concerning individual land parcels by taking into
account the overall development picture. The problems with such
centralized planning are also obvious, including the potential misallocation
of resources and neglect of individual interests. The market reforms
launched in the 1980s dismantled the planned economy, resulting in
various economic activities being freed from central government control.
China promulgated its first urban planning law in December 1989, making
urban planning permits a separate requirement in the land use permit
system.42 In the years since, urban planning in China has gradually moved
in the direction of American-style land use regulations, with the further
retreat of government power from economic activities and the expansion of
individual property rights. Today, the government plays a dual role in the
development of land: it is both the primary land supplier and the land use
38. Id.
39. Shitong Qiao, The Politics of Chinese Land: Partial Reform, Vested Interests, and Small
Property, 29 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 70, 75 (2015).
40. Id. at 82
41. Id. at 78 (“It was clear from the RRLSC that all land use must be consistent with the State’s
economic plan.”). The Chinese system is in many ways similar to that of cities in early United States.
See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730–1870 (G. Edward White ed., 1983).
42. See 中华人民共和国城市规划法 [City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Apr. 1, 1990,
invalidated by the Urban and Rural Planning Law, Oct. 28, 2007), art. 31, translated in 1987–1989
P.R.C. LAWS 349 (describing the application process for a construction project in a planned urban area).

478

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

regulator. As the primary land supplier, the government is able to define
the scope and content of individual land use rights in land use assignment
contracts with individual land users.43 It can then further regulate individual
land uses through its regulatory power, similar to the power of local
governments in the U.S.
The U.S. and Chinese systems started from very different, almost
polar, positions, with the former focused on private rights and the latter on
government privilege, but over time the number of similarities between the
two have increased. Land use control in China originated in the planned
economy, as noted, with the state exercising control over land as both land
owner and economic planner. However, with the ongoing shift toward
private property ownership, the government’s power to shape development
has become more circumscribed. In the U.S., the land use system began
with little government intervention, but over time the government’s role
gradually increased, and today local governments play a meaningful role in
directing development. These two different, but converging, frameworks
have shaped the development process in both countries. Nevertheless, the
government monopoly of the land market is still the defining characteristic
of land use control in China. In the U.S., as discussed in more detail in the
following section, homeowners also cartelize housing supply through their
control of city governments. A monopolized market does not generate
optimal housing, regardless of which entities are doing the monopolizing.44
B. POLITICAL MARKET: GROWTH MACHINE VS. HOMEVOTERS
Urban governance has long been described as a war between growth
elites, such as land developers, and homeowners, who are also voters. In
1976, Harvey Molotch coined the term “growth machine” to describe the
efforts of the former group:
A city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal
expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen
to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area
in which its members hold a common interest. An elite competes with
other land-based elites in an effort to have growth-inducing resources
invested within its own area as opposed to that of another. Governmental
authority, at the local and nonlocal levels, is utilized
to
assist
in

43. Shitong Qiao, The Evolution of Chinese Land Law: Stick by Stick?, in PRIVATE LAW IN
CHINA AND TAIWAN: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES 182, 191–95 (Yun-Chien Chang, Wei Shen &
Wen-Yeu Wang eds., 2017).
44. See Hamilton, supra note 32, at 116.
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achieving this growth at the expense of competing localities. Conditions
of community life are largely a consequence of the social, economic, and
political forces embodied in this growth machine. 45

In the same article, Molotch speculated that “the political and
economic essence of virtually any given locality, in the present American
context, is growth.”46 However, also in the 1970s, homeowners began to
erode the power of the pro-development growth machine coalition.
According to William Fischel:
[U]nprecedented peacetime inflation, touched off by the oil cartel OPEC,
combined with longstanding federal tax privileges to transform owneroccupied houses into growth stocks. The inability to insure the newfound
value of their homes converted homeowners into “homevoters,” whose
local political behavior focused on preventing development that might
devalue their homes.47

Originally, this occurred in the suburbs, but recently homevoters have also
begun to overtake the growth machine in big cities.48
A typical land use dispute is therefore a drama featuring three main
players: the developer (the main actor in the growth machine), neighbors
(i.e., neighboring homeowners, along with, in U.S. megacities, the renters
whose neighborhood longevity has created a vested interest), and the local
government. The developer “triggers the dispute” by proposing to carry out
a controversial activity. 49 The neighbors of the land under dispute
constitute “the developer’s first and main line of opposition.”50 The local
government in whose jurisdiction the land is located is then the “principal
institution” tasked with “reconciling the competing interests” of the two
other parties. 51 This triangular framework dominates discussions of land
use disputes in both land use casebooks 52 and law review articles.53 The
way in which the framework unfolds depends on the decision-making
mechanisms, which can be simplified into three models.
The first can be called the “omniscient dictator” model. Land use
45. Molotch, supra note 10, at 309.
46. Id. at 309–10.
47. Fischel, supra note 11, at 1.
48. Been et al., supra note 8, at 229; Schleicher, supra note 8, at 1682–83.
49. ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 73 (3d
ed. 2005).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See generally id.
53. See, e.g., Been et al., supra note 8, at 228; Schleicher, supra note 8, at 1676–77.

480

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

decisions are made by a dictator who has the ability to costlessly determine
the relative value of different land use arrangements. The second model is a
more democratic or majoritarian model, in which proposals are accepted or
rejected by some sort of majority vote by a representative decision-making
body. At first blush, land use decisions in China fall under the dictator
model, with an authoritarian local government deciding what is appropriate
and individual property owners lacking any say in the matter, whereas
those in the U.S. fall under the democratic model, as the mayors and city
councils making decisions are elected, and zoning decisions are often
subject to a democratic vote.
However, neither model provides an ultimate answer to the question
of who decides which projects go forward. In the Chinese dictator model,
we still need to determine what the dictator considers in making decisions,
whereas in the American democratic model, we still need to determine
what constitutes a majority. This is where the third model, the “influence
model,” comes in. The Chinese “dictator” does not have all of the
information necessary to make land use decisions, and thus decisions are
based on various policy considerations as influenced by a range of
interested parties, including real estate developers but also industrial land
users and neighboring homeowners, who cannot vote but who can exercise
influence in other ways. 54 In the American democratic model, what
constitutes a majority is a difficult question to answer, as a small number of
property owners often wield disproportionate influence, with the views of
other members of the community neglected. City councilors make
decisions with imperfect information and under the influence of various
interests. Accordingly, the influence model explains land use decisions in
both China and the U.S. better than either the omniscient dictator or
democratic models.
Throughout U.S. history, homeowners were not against development
when they themselves were part of the growth machine and benefited from
additional development. According to Fischel, the rise of suburban
America and the separation of home from work led to the NIMBY
movement, resulting in the displacement of the growth machine. 55
Homeowners concerned about the value of their property, and the

54. See, e.g., Thomas Johnson, Environmentalism and NIMBYism in China: Promoting a RulesBased Approach to Public Participation, 19 ENVTL. POL. 430, 430–31 (2010); Yi Sun, Facilitating
Generation of Local Knowledge Using a Collaborative Initiator: A NIMBY Case in Guangzhou, China,
46 HABITAT INT'L. 130, 131–32 (2015).
55. Fischel, supra note 11, at 4–8.
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homeowners associations that represent them, took control of local
governments, exercising a dominant influence in zoning decisions. 56 In
China, by contrast, homeowners are not particularly powerful, although
their influence is growing in conjunction with their rise in both numbers
and power. Chinese cities are also considered super growth machines, and
thus pro-development, although that has not prevented them from
becoming exclusionary.
Land use decisions are subject to the dynamics of the political market,
which, as Douglass North wrote, concern “the underlying rules that are the
incentive structure of an economy—property rights, contracting, and
credible commitment.” 57 North further highlighted two problems in
political markets. The first is that there may be imperfect information and
cognition—that is, one must ask how well the representatives of various
interests know their interests and whether “the collective outcome [is]
rational, in the sense that policies could have been devised that rendered all
concerned better off.”58 Correcting for this, Hills and Schleicher argued that
local governments can combat NIMBYism through comprehensive citywide plans, ensuring that the potential burden of new development is
widely shared.59 Residents do not oppose all new construction, they pointed
out. Rather, they worry that they will be forced to accept more than their
neighborhood’s “fair share.”60 To combat homeowners’ strong aversion to
development in their neighborhoods, Hills and Schleicher proposed a
budget zoning system that renders the overall costs to individual
neighborhoods much more visible. To address the same problem, Fennell
proposed decoupling the investment volatility associated with off-site
influences on housing from the homeowner’s bundle, 61 whereas Fischel
proposed “reduc[ing] the tax advantages of homeownership” and
“equaliz[ing] the tax treatment of capital gains from housing with that of
other assets.” 62 Albeit through different means, all these scholars try to

56. Id. at 4–6.
57. Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 356–
57 (1990).
58. Id. at 357–58 (quoting Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of Controls: American
Sugar 38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2504, 1988).
59. Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 8, at 95. See also Hills & Schleicher, Balancing,
supra note 8, at 89–90.
60. Hills & Schleicher, Balancing, supra note 8, at 102 (“[N]o legislator will vote to allow a new
development in her district unless she can be sure everyone else will reciprocate by taking their fair
share of the housing needed to meet demand.”).
61. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (2008).
62. Fischel, supra note 11, at 13–14.
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address homeowners’ concerns about property values and their strong
aversion to development.
The second problem highlighted by North is credible commitment:
constituents vote for representatives who commit to protecting their
interests—indeed, Fischel’s confidence in homevoters requires the
assumption that city councilors are bound by their commitments 63 —but
representatives may later be captured by interest groups and fail to honor
their commitments. 64 The growth machine hypothesis falls into this
category: city councilors and urban planning officials violate their
commitments to homevoters and decide in favor of growth elites instead.
Under this theory, growth elites distort the political market, leading to
inefficiency.
Contracting costs or transaction costs are another problem. Hills and
Schleicher argue that “decentralized” and “lot-by-lot” zoning decisions
impede development by raising developers’ costs of lobbying for still more
development.65 The solution, they averred, is to elevate zoning decisions to
a city-wide system.66 A comprehensive and binding plan would both ensure
credible commitment—through a package deal guaranteeing community
representatives on city councils that their constituents will not bear
disproportionate burdens—and also greatly reduce transaction costs.67 This
idea of metropolitan urban planning derives from the long-standing U.S.
debate over planning versus zoning, dating back to as early as the 1950s.68
American cities have never taken comprehensive plans seriously, despite
academics advocating for such plans. 69 But Chinese cities have welldesigned comprehensive plans. The making of such plans proves to be
more challenging than academics imagine, and their effect is more limited
than academics expect.70 Would comprehensive plans work in New York
City or San Francisco? We do not know for sure. Do comprehensive plans
63. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 4.
64. North, supra note 57, at 357–60, 363–64.
65. Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 8, at 95.
66. See id. at 94–95 (arguing for “centralized” plans).
67. See id. at 92.
68. See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 353, 365–66 (1955). See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, The Comprehensive Planning
Requirement in Urban Renewal, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1967); Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing:
Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837 (1983). For a
fantastic literature review of this debate, see generally Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 8.
69. See Hills & Schleicher, Planning, supra note 8, at 102–04.
70. See generally Wing-Shing Tang, Chinese Urban Planning at Fifty: An Assessment of the
Planning Theory Literature, 14 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 347 (2000).
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work in Beijing or Shanghai? By the standard of providing affordable
housing, the answer is no!—they are instrumental in reducing, rather than
increasing, affordable housing. Either way, though, whether to use
comprehensive plans or piecemeal deal-making is a secondary question for
those who participate in the decision-making process.
That leaves us with the preliminary question to any bargaining: the
initial allocation of property rights. Defining who is entitled to what is a
precondition of any market exchange, and political transactions are no
exception. Property rights on the political market mean entitlement to
political bargaining. In both the American and Chinese cases, the power of
property owners outweighs the influence of others in the decision-making
process. 71 Even with the above proposals in place, housing is likely to
continue to be the most important investment that most people make, and
homeowners’ interests will remain aligned with less development and
against competition for public resources from outsiders. If the political
market for urban governance does not check homeowners’ growth-control
tendencies, any reform measures will likely be of only limited effect.
Fischel actually concedes that his proposals may only “slow down the
growth of growth controls, not reverse them.” 72 As far as non-property
owners who have no direct access to political bargaining, their interests
would not be reflected and protected by a property-dominated political
market. This is a fundamental problem.
To summarize, the failure of the political markets of urban governance
in China and the U.S. cannot be attributed solely to the property owners’
information and cognition insufficiency, the high transaction costs in
decentralized decision-making, or the challenge to community
representatives to make credible commitments to each other. Entitlement to
political bargaining is the first question we need to solve before reaching a
more detailed institutional design.
C. THE VOICELESSNESS OF HOUSING CONSUMERS IN MEGACITIES
There is a fundamental limitation in the aforementioned development
triangle in both jurisdictions: it only partially incorporates the interests of
the ultimate consumers of the activity in question, i.e., the potential buyers
and renters of the housing to be developed. More specifically, Robert
Ellickson identified the housing consumers who suffer from exclusionary

71.
72.

See, e.g., North, supra note 57, at 357.
Fischel, supra note 11, at 13.
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land use controls, including: “(1) current tenants who like [a city] too much
to want to move out . . . ; and (2) all households that move into [a city] in
the future;” as well as (3) “tenants who subsequently leave the municipality
because their rents go up; and [(4)] potential immigrants to [a city] who
have decided not to buy or rent there simply because of the price increase
caused by the antigrowth policies.”73
In megacities in both China and the U.S., land use decisions are made
without full consideration of the ultimate housing consumers, and, in
practice, those consumers are rarely sufficiently organized to exert any
influence on land use decisions74 and are given few opportunities to voice
their concerns. Theoretically, housing suppliers should care about the
ultimate consumers, and therefore speak for them in the process of making
land use decisions. However, profit-maximizing developers prefer building
more expensive and therefore more profitable housing and are far from
perfect proxies for the interests of housing consumers. They are rarely
interested in lobbying for middle- and low-income populations, from which
they cannot draw sufficient profits to justify their expenses (particularly in
areas with high construction and regulatory costs), 75 which is why
governments in both jurisdictions often require developers to build
affordable housing, a phenomenon that in certain situations is defined as
constitutionally controversial exaction. 76 So-called “inclusionary housing
programs” are designed to counterbalance the exclusionary effects of
developer-driven markets. Although who ultimately bears the costs of
exaction is highly debatable, the underlying consensus on the exclusionary
nature of real estate development is solid.77
Democratic local governments in the U.S. are supposed to represent
the interests of middle- and low-income populations; municipal
corporations are different from business corporations in the sense that they
allow “one person one vote” rather than “one acre one vote.” 78
Nevertheless, the country’s long tradition of municipal corporations
strongly favors homevoters. The individuals who are truly able to influence
73. Ellickson, supra note 37, at 402.
74. Cf. id. at 402, 436–38; Andrew H. Whittemore, Zoning Los Angeles: A Brief History of Four
Regimes, 27 PLAN. PERSP. 393, 393–94 (2012).
75. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 155–58 (1992).
76. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 49, at 671–74.
77. Id.
78. See generally JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF
MODERN URBAN GOVERNMENT 1650–1825 (1975).
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the zoning process are normally property owners, who vote at higher rates
than others and express their preferences more robustly. 79 Authoritarian
local governments in China monopolize primary land markets in their cities
and rely on land sales revenue as a major source of their revenue.80 They
are motivated to keep land prices and therefore housing prices high.81
In short, property ownership prevails in both the Chinese and
American zoning processes. In this Article, we examine the functions and
mechanisms of land use regulations and role of public participation in both
jurisdictions to demonstrate the dominating influence of property
ownership in urban governance.
If there is no change to the fundamental character of urban land
governance shared by these two countries’ megacities, such cities will
continue to be exclusionary. Exclusion is not necessarily inefficient or
unfair per se. Property owners do have a legitimate claim to preserving
their particular living styles and values through land use controls. 82 But
such controls should be evaluated in a larger social context, beyond
property owners’ interests and values. When an exclusionary community is
fungible, i.e., when there are plenty of location options from which
consumers can choose, exclusionary policies are tolerable. 83 However,
megacities are not fungible. They are the economic and cultural centers of
the whole nation and occupy unique, monopolizing positions in the market
of places. In such a situation, housing consumers cannot simply exercise
their right to exit in order to discipline megacity governments. When they
do leave, they may suffer a loss of better career opportunities—the
population flow from coastal cities to Texas is an example84— and when
they do not leave, they either pay higher rents or suffer from much poorer
living environments. “Ant tribes” in Beijing—people living in crowded,

79. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 8, 16, 75–76 (2001).
80. See Qiao, supra note 39, at 85–88, 96–98.
81. See supra Section I.A.
82. Ellickson, supra note 37, at 401 (“Residents may genuinely prefer that their municipality
remain the way it is rather than grow rapidly.”).
83. Id. at 430.
84. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 9 (“To East Coast urbanites, Houston’s appeal must be
mysterious: the city isn’t all that economically productive—earnings per employee in Manhattan are
almost double those in Houston.”); Kotkin, supra note 5 (“The nation’s three largest metropolitan areas
fall to the bottom of our list: Los Angeles (46th), Chicago (52nd) and, in last place New York. Since
2010, the New York metro area has lost a net 529,000 domestic migrants, adding to the 1.9 million who
departed from 2000 to 2009.”). Cf. id. (“[S]everal Texas cities . . . have logged strong job
growth . . . .”).
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underground spaces85—are examples of this.
Moreover, some proposals assume that real estate developers are
appropriate proxies for the needs of future consumers. 86 However, real
estate development in megacities is expensive—in capital, risk, and time—
which pushes developers to focus on projects that promise the highest
return: namely, those that produce more expensive housing. In and of itself,
unleashing the market—albeit important—will not fully resolve this
problem. In theory, filtering, a process whereby “higher income households
move on,” with the “homes or apartments they formerly occupied . . .
[being] sold or rented to people with more modest incomes,” generates a
large amount of housing stock affordable to middle- and low-income
populations.87 In a 2014 article, though, Stuart Rosenthal rigorously tested
the filtering effect and found considerable variation in different parts of the
U.S. 88 He noted in particular that severe restrictions on new housing
construction have significantly slowed down the filtering process in coastal
regions.89
Since the market of places cannot effectively discipline megacity
governments, everybody, including property owners and consumers, is to
some extent trapped in such unique locations, and improving urban
governance is the only solution. In the highly monopolized political and
property markets, the ultimate consumers who are residents or potential
residents of megacities are voiceless. Those who care most about
affordable housing have no representatives, and thus their interests are
sacrificed, resulting in an inadequate housing supply in both American and
Chinese megacities. Inefficient land use regulations persist because they
85. See, e.g., Sue Feng, China’s Graduates: An Ant’s Life, WALL ST. J.: CHINA REAL TIME REP.
(Nov. 5, 2009, 4:42 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/11/05/chinas-graduates-an-antslife; Kevin Tang, China’s “Ant Tribe” Lives in the World's Most Cramped Apartments, BUZZFEED
(Nov. 27, 2013, 7:12 AM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/kevintang/chinas-ant-tribe-lives-in-the-worldsmost-cramped-apartments.
86. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 511–16 (1991); Christopher Serkin,
Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 888–89
(2007).
87. Daniel Hertz, What Filtering Can and Can’t Do, CITY OBSERVATORY: CITY COMMENT.
(Oct. 11, 2015), http://cityobservatory.org/what-filtering-can-and-cant-do. See also Stuart S. Rosenthal,
Are Private Markets and Filtering a Viable Source of Low-Income Housing? Estimates from a “Repeat
Income” Model, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 687, 687 (2014) (“[P]rivate markets are thought to provide lowincome housing primarily through a dynamic process in which homes built for higher income families
slowly deteriorate and filter down to lower income households.”).
88. Rosenthal, supra note 87, at 704.
89. See id. at 688–89.
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serve the interests of growth elites (in China) and/or homevoters (in the
U.S.). In both cases, those without property pay the price of exclusion.
***
In summary, despite their fundamentally different origins, the land use
regimes in both Chinese and American cities can be understood as
examples of the influence model, wherein different parties with conflicting
interests exert influence over land use decisions. First appearances suggest
that the U.S. and Chinese regimes remain fundamentally different, with
property owners dominant in the former, and growth elites in the latter.
However, once we link urban governance with property rights, the two
jurisdictions begin to appear more similar than different: urban governance
in both jurisdictions is based on the pursuit of value maximization by
property rights owners. In the Chinese context, a slight caveat is needed:
the government is the primary land owner, and thus plays a major role,
while rising middle-class homeowners play a minor role. The young,
middle-, and low-income populations that own no property are severely
underrepresented in, if not totally absent from, the political market of urban
governance in both jurisdictions. In the following sections, we present
detailed analyses of both regimes.
II. LAND USE IN AMERICAN MEGACITIES: CONCEPT,
MECHANISM, AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
American property law evinces a strong disposition toward property
owners. Protection of private property from government incursion has been
an important legal principle since the framing of the Constitution. Although
the history of American law can be interpreted as one of increasing
government influence over private property, the rights of property owners
to control the uses of their property remain strong. 90 The U.S. zoning
system must be understood in the context of this framework. However,
reliance on the “sanctity of private property” is not helpful when the
activities of one property owner impact the enjoyment of another property
owner. The zoning system emerged to mediate this tension. Over the course
a century of zoning law, the system has come to encompass much more
than just a framework to mediate disputes between individual property
owners.91 Zoning shapes the communities in which Americans live, work,
90. See FISCHEL, supra note 79, at 215 (“After zoning was established, however, the suburbs did
not have to bow to the inevitability of convergence with their neighbors. They could control their own
destiny.”); Fischel, supra note 11, at 4–6; Been et al, supra note 8, at 231.
91. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. SCHWIETERMAN & DANA M. CASPALL, THE POLITICS OF PLACE: A
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and play. It shapes social interactions and strongly influences the
opportunities to which individuals have access. As a result, zoning
decisions are among the most contested legal disputes in the country.92 As
this Part will argue, in recent years, policymakers have expressed
increasing concern over the dominant role that the zoning system plays in
America’s economic and social life. No place exemplifies these tensions
better than the country’s largest city, New York.
This Part is organized as follows: Section A briefly describes the
historic roots of U.S. zoning law, focusing on the role of zoning rules to
supplement and add further protection for private property owners in the
context of industrialization. Section B discusses the changes in the
sociopolitical context in which development happens in the U.S., arguing
that the growth machine has, in general, given way to anti-development
sentiment in urbanized areas. Finally, Section C focuses on New York City
as a place that is struggling to balance public involvement in zoning
decisions with the need to increase the amount of affordable housing in the
city. New York’s example reveals the very high obstacles facing efforts to
make American cities (at least those experiencing growth) more inclusive.
A. ZONING AGAINST NUISANCE
Before the twentieth century, land use disputes were resolved as
private actions among property owners.93 This system worked fairly well
until industrialization and urbanization dramatically increased the types and
intensities of land use and disrupted traditional legal relations. Facing
escalating tensions over the appropriate uses of property, American zoning
law built on nineteenth-century nuisance law, which granted property
owners protections against the acts of neighbors that affected the
enjoyment of their property. 94 Property owners at common law often
claimed damages from noxious activities in their vicinity, and nuisance
claims were, until the early twentieth century, the predominant means by

HISTORY OF ZONING IN CHICAGO (Jane Heron ed., 2006); William A. Fischel, An Economic History of
Zoning and a Cure for Its Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317 (2004) (explaining how zoning
transformed from a means to mediate disputes to a means of exclusion).
92. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); S. Burlington Cty.
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
93. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 721–22 (1973).
94. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 49, at 74–76 (discussing the evolution of zoning laws).
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which property owners protected their rights.95
As American urbanization increased, many cities built upon these
common law rules with legislative provisions protecting property owners
against damage from their neighbors’ acts.96 Industrialization created many
new noxious uses, however, and great increases in the population density of
American cities resulted in many more nuisance disputes. Governments
struggled to balance their desire to promote development with their
responsibility to protect property, and they experimented with different
approaches.97 Often the rules granted property owners the right to prohibit a
nuisance use unless the property owner obtained from adjacent neighbors a
majority (or supermajority) of votes approving the activity. Among the first
of these laws was Chicago’s, which prohibited several noxious uses, such
as livery stables, unless approved by a majority of the neighbors. 98
Chicago’s law, as well as many others, was attacked as both too restrictive
and an inappropriate delegation of government power, but courts generally
ruled that these approaches were proper.99
Zoning law did not replace private law protections but rather emerged
out of them. Zoning was a more “efficient” way to make community-based
decisions about appropriate urban land uses. The basic principle of zoning
was that urban “zones” separated industrial, commercial, and residential
uses, while also differentiating amongst the types of residential use.100 This
separation of uses protected the public interest and property rights,
providing security to property owners that their interests would not be
damaged by the acts of one another. At the same time, the provision for
different types of uses ensured that cities could continue to grow and
prosper. Under modern zoning, industrial uses also received protection
from the nuisance claims of adjacent property owners. Confident in the
security of their operations, owners of industrial concerns could continue to
expand their efforts.101
95. Ellickson, supra note 93, at 721–22.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law:
1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1105–08 (1986); Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the
Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 408–11 (1974).
98. See SCHWIETERMAN & CASPALL, supra note 91, at 13 (“Frontage-consent ordinances . . .
were based on nuisance doctrines and required that the majority of residential owners on a block
provide consent before certain land uses would be permitted.”).
99. See id.
100. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 49, at 73–98 (discussing the evolution of zoning through
the Euclid decision).
101. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 97, at 408.
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Under this new zoning regime, the decision of where to place different
uses was often made by professionals who had studied the most efficient
ways to allocate land uses and who developed “comprehensive plan[s]” for
urban areas that protected the public and promoted economic growth.102
These comprehensive plans were made with the input of the public,
particularly property owners. Both the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
(“SSZEA”) and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (“SCPEA”)—the
land-use frameworks developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in
the 1920s and promoted around the country—required public input in the
development of comprehensive plans. 103 This requirement was in
accordance with Progressive Era principles of citizen engagement, which
envisioned an enlightened citizenry, led by professionals, who would
provide meaningful input to guide the public interest.104
While comprehensive plans were made with public input, the public’s
role in the daily operations of the zoning process was less clear. Under the
act, most localities created Zoning Boards of Adjustment (“ZBA”) to
administer the system. 105 The role of the ZBA was to hear exceptional
cases, where a property owner wanted to use property in a manner not in
accordance with the zoning code.106 ZBAs were envisioned as professional
organizations that would objectively determine whether developments met
the legal requirements specified under the zoning code for a variance from
the general rules. 107 Early zoning advocates believed that planning
principles could be developed that would promote the public interest, and
that once these principles were applied to a city it could follow its natural
development. 108 As a result, public participation in the variance process
was not strictly necessary, although the SSZEA does provide that “all
meetings of the board shall be open to the public,” any person “aggrieved”
by the acts of a ZBA may appeal its decisions, and any aggrieved person,
102. Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning (Making Room for Robert
Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650,
652–53 (1958).
103. See id. at 654, 656–58. See also A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT §§ 8, 15
(DEPT. OF COMMERCE 1928); A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §§ 4, 7 (DEPT. OF
COMMERCE 1926).
104. See Dunham, supra note 102, at 654, 656–57.
105. Phillip P. Green Jr., The Power of the Zoning Board of Adjustment to Grant Variances from
the Zoning Ordinance, 29 N.C. L. REV. 245, 245 (1951).
106. Id. at 245–46. See also Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board of
Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KY. L.J. 273, 273 (1962).
107. See Green, supra note 105, at 245–48.
108. See, e.g., Paul Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS
331, 335 (1965).
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taxpayer, or city official may sue over “illegal” ZBA actions.109
The original zoning acts were vague about the role of the public in the
zoning adjustment process itself, though, as advocates believed there would
be few variances because plans would accurately capture neighborhood
demands and the goals of the market.110 In addition, any needed variances
would be granted by professionals well-versed in planning and zoning.111
Of course, this objective vision of the planning process came quickly under
assault, with ZBAs the locus of heated battles amongst stakeholders over
the appropriate uses of property.112 As a result, over the last fifty years the
zoning system has struggled to balance demands for transparent and
legitimate decision-making with the desire for efficient operations to
promote development.
B. HOMEVOTERS: NOT IN MY BACKYARD
The zoning system in the United States is approximately one hundred
years old. That history can be fairly neatly divided into to two equal
periods. These names of these two eras—first the “Growth Machine,”
followed by “NIMBY” (“Not In My Back Yard”)—succinctly encapsulate
the continuing challenge of balancing competing interests in the land use
system.
From the 1920s until the 1970s, the Growth Machine framework
predominated in American cities and their suburbs. 113 Throughout the
country, housing and economic development were seen as almost
unqualified positives. Local governments organized around the generally
agreed-upon desire for growth. In the post-World War II era, suburban
development in the United States skyrocketed, as did the percentage of the
American population living in those areas. 114 Fearing the loss of
population, business, and, therefore, tax revenues, city governments across
the country undertook large-scale efforts to reorganize and make

109. A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT §§ 7, 11 (DEPT. OF COMMERCE 1926).
110. See, e.g., Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power—Constructive in Theory,
Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3, 18–22 (1969).
111. See id.
112. See David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform
of a Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 295–98 (2004); Carol M. Rose, New Models
for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1155, 1155–57 (1984).
113. See Molotch, supra note 10, at 321.
114. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 232–34 (1987).

492

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

themselves attractive to development.115 During the “urban renewal era,”
which reached its height in the 1950s and 1960s, cities cleared large swaths
of land, uprooting their residents and partnering with private developers to
build modern residential and commercial facilities.116 They also rebuilt the
urban infrastructure, creating the modern urban highway system (which
uprooted even more people than housing and commercial developments).117
Most of this activity occurred with little public involvement.
Government officials, real estate developers, urban planners, and other
elites made these decisions and presented them to the public as faits
accomplis. This public acquiescence started to change in the 1960s, with
increasing public protests over highway and other clearance proposals, and
accelerated greatly in the 1970s when, as William Fischel argues,
suburban-citizen revolts over growth added to the objections to urban
renewal.118 The result of this public outrage was that zoning dynamics were
radically altered, and for the past fifty years land use regulation has been
among the most hotly contested of public topics.119
Each year, thousands of neighbors, and others, appear before zoning
boards to voice support or, more commonly, opposition to zoning changes
or special exceptions/variances regarding specific development projects.120
Generally, this is a post-1970 phenomenon. Before the advent of modern
neighborhood organizations, most zoning board meetings were sleepy
affairs. 121 However, the backlash against urban renewal and highway
programs (along with other types of neighborhood activism) resulted in a
significant increase in neighborhood organizations, and much of the focus
of these groups was on preventing or at least shaping development. 122
Neighbors frequently fight against projects that would increase density,
affect parking availability, or change neighborhood aesthetics and culture.
Their goal is to prevent or at least slow neighborhood development, and,
overall, these efforts are successful. 123 For example, in San Francisco,
115. See, e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 21 (2003).
116. Id.
117. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
19 (1974).
118. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 19–21, 26–27.
119. See id. at 13, 21–25.
120. See id. at 18–19.
121. See id. at 17, 26. Cf. Mangin, supra note 8, at 101.
122. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 13; Mangin, supra note 8, at 108–10.
123. See, e.g., Mangin, supra note 8, at 99–100 (describing the ease with which San Francisco can
“zone[] up”).
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despite the significant demand for housing, neighborhood insistence upon
regulations to limit density severely restricts new development. In 2011,
the city, which has among the highest housing costs in the country, “added
just 269 housing units.”124
Because of their crucial role in shaping new development, zoning
boards also became the prime venue in which to fight neighborhood racial
and social change, both in the cities and the suburbs. As Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. showed, by
the 1960s, zoning regulations were an effective means of racial
exclusion, 125 and the past forty years, the citizens of New Jersey have
debated the 1975 Mt. Laurel decision, which required suburban
governments to adjust their land use regulations to provide for the
construction of affordable housing.126 No issue in the state has been more
contentious over this period,127 and there and in many other states, local
governments are organized around the desire to exclude certain populations
and uses.128
Because opponents of development play such a significant role in the
zoning process, several states have attempted to regulate their participation.
Some, such as Minnesota, are skeptical about neighborhood influence and
consider neighbor opposition a factor in determining the (ir)rationality of
zoning board decisions. 129 But, in general, local governments have wide
latitude to control the shape, scope, and population of their communities
through land use regulation. Many legal practitioners, developers, and
academics have come to criticize the “neighborhood veto” for its role in
impeding development and exacerbating related economic and racial
segregation. As Michael Lewyn argues, “This ‘neighborhood veto’
sometimes artificially reduces housing supply and urban density, thus
making housing more expensive and making American cities more
124. Id. at 99.
125. Harold A. Ellis, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of Zoning, 7 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 285–86 (1992). See also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255, 263 (1977) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to prove that the zoning laws
had a racially discriminatory purpose, though this may have been their effect).
126. See generally S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975).
127. See Roderick M. Hills Jr., Saving Mount Laurel, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1612–14
(2013).
128. See MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 18–19.
129. See Ellis, supra note 125, at 284, 297–98. See also generally Edward G. Goetz & Barbara
Lukermann, The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income
Housing in Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31 (2004).

494

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

dependent on automobiles.”130 However, opposition to new development is
the dominant position in much of the country.
C. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (AND REFORMS): THE EXAMPLE OF NEW YORK
CITY
To many observers, New York City is the quintessential example of a
“growth machine” city. Real estate development has always played a
central role in the city’s economic life. The real estate sector is one of the
largest in the urban economy, and real estate was, and is, the foundation of
many of the city’s largest fortunes.131 Real estate developers in New York
City have had a major influence on the shape of the city as well as its
politics and culture. Few cities did more during the urban renewal era to
reshape themselves to be even more responsive to modern commercial and
residential development. New York’s master builder Robert Moses—“The
Power Broker”—remains for many the face of urban redevelopment. 132
However, New York is and always has been a city of neighborhoods, and
those neighborhoods have frequently pushed back against development.
Today, as in many times previous, the growth machine and the
neighborhoods are at odds. 133 As with many aspects of this city, the
struggle has implications for land use conflicts elsewhere.
Given that it was the first city to pass a zoning law, it is not surprising
that New York also has the most developed structure for community
participation in land use. In 1951, Manhattan Borough President Robert
Wagner created a series of neighborhood advisory boards to help him make
decisions on land use and development, and these “Community Planning
Boards” were incorporated into the city planning structure with the passage
of the revised city charter of 1963.134 Updated in 1968 and again in 1975,
the city created fifty-nine community planning boards, each of which has
authority to develop comprehensive plans for their district or parts of it.135
Appointed by the Borough President, each board can have up to fifty
members. The boards also have authority to “cooperate and consult with

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Michael Lewyn, Against the Neighborhood Veto, 44 REAL EST. L.J. 82, 82 (2015).
See, e.g., RICHARD PLUNZ, A HISTORY OF HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY xli–xliii (2016).
See Caro, supra note 117.
See Been et al., supra note 8, at 228–29.
See RAYMOND CHARLES RAUSCHER & SALIM MOMTAZ, BROOKLYN’S BUSHWICK—URBAN
RENEWAL IN NEW YORK, USA 63–64 (2014); Richard Bass & Cuz Potter, A Tale of Three Northern
Manhattan Communities: Case Studies of Political Empowerment in the Planning and Development
Process, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 287 (2004).
135. See Bass & Potter, supra note 134, at 288–89.
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local administrators of city departments and agencies,” and “to cooperate
with other boards on matters of common concern.”136 Under the Uniform
Land Use Review Procedure (“ULURP”), also created in 1975, community
boards have sixty days to review and make a recommendation on any
development project that is required to have approval of the borough
president. Community board recommendations are only “advisory” and do
not have any legal weight either in the planning process or upon the
decision of the borough president.137
Over the years, community planning boards have been criticized both
for being too influential in preventing development and for being
ineffective representatives of the community against powerful development
interests.138 Critics have also raised questions about the qualifications of
community board members and the representativeness of boards.139 While,
in theory, community boards can develop comprehensive plans, the budgets
provided for these organizations do not support such efforts, and many
boards have had to raise outside funding to support their activities. Not
surprisingly, studies have found that community planning boards in
wealthy neighborhoods have higher capacity and more influence than those
in poorer neighborhoods.140
But the influence of community boards has definitely increased over
time, as was particularly evident during the neighborhood rezonings
initiated by the administration of Mayor Michael Bloomberg. From the
beginning of Bloomberg’s term in 2002, the administration, arguing that
the city’s zoning resolution—dating to 1961—was outdated, undertook
more than 100 neighborhood rezonings, with the goal of modernizing the
regulations in these districts to make them more responsive to community
needs and development trends. 141 In most of these rezonings, the
community planning board played a central role, and, in general, that role
was to protect the neighborhood against higher-density development. In a
comprehensive study of this initiative, Vicki Been and her colleagues
concluded that while the totality of the rezonings resulted in a city-wide
136.
137.

Id. at 289.
Tom Angotti, Race, Place and Waste: Community Planning in New York City, 1999 NEW
VILLAGE J. 5, 5.
138. See id. at 5–6; Robert F. Pecorella, Community Governance: A Decade of Experience, 37
PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 97, 102–03 (1989).
139. See, e.g., Howell S. Baum, Community Organizations Recruiting Community Participation:
Predicaments in Planning, 18 J. PLANNING EDUC. & RES. 187, 188 (1999).
140. See Angotti, supra note 137, at 5–6; Pecorella, supra note 138, at 100–01 & tbl.3.
141. Been et al., supra note 8, at 241.
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1.7% residential capacity increase, more parcels were “down-zoned,” to
place greater restrictions on potential future development, than the number
of parcels that were “up-zoned.”142 Furthermore, many of the parcels that
were down-zoned were in areas close to mass transit or other amenities
that, under “smart growth” principles, made them appropriate for higherdensity development. 143 The result in many neighborhoods was that
properties that could have been used to meet increased housing demand in
the city were, at least temporarily, removed from the potential development
inventory.
Like many other U.S. cities, New York currently faces a significant
housing affordability problem. A significant percentage of the population
pays more than half of their income for housing. 144 While the city is
experiencing a development boom, almost all of the new housing is for the
highest income residents. In Manhattan the average sale price for a one
bedroom apartment exceeds $1 million. 145 Unmet housing demand has
resulted in a dramatic increase in housing prices in many parts of the city,
and developers looking to meet that need have increased construction in
previously-ignored neighborhoods.146 A recent analysis of housing in the
city determined that 34.3% of city neighborhoods were experiencing
gentrification.147
Long major political issues, housing costs and neighborhood changes
were central to New York’s 2013 mayoral election. During his campaign,
Mayor Bill de Blasio gave great attention to the city’s housing shortage
City, specifically the lack of affordable housing to support the city’s poor
and working-class residents. 148 A year after his election, de Blasio
142. Id. at 252.
143. Id. at 252–253 (“[D]ownzoned lots were more likely to be located near . . . rail stations than
the typical lot located outside a rezoning project study area.”).
144. See Rachel Sugar, More than Half of New Yorkers Are Rent Burdened: Study, CURBED (Dec.
15, 2016, 11:04 AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2016/12/15/13967302/new-yorkers-cost-burden-rentalmarket-apartment-list.
145. Amy X. Wang, The Average Manhattan Apartment Now Costs $1 Million, QUARTZ, (Oct. 1,
2015), https://qz.com/515524/the-average-manhattan-apartment-now-costs-1-million.
146. NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2015
43 & fig.4 (2016), http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb3/downloads/resources/NYUFurmanCenter_
SOCin2015_9JUNE2016.pdf.
147. Id. at 5. The study defined gentrified neighborhoods as “sub-borough areas (SBAs) . . . that
were low-income in 1990 and experienced rent growth above the median SBA rent growth between
1990 and 2010–2014.” Id. at 4.
148. See, e.g., Henry Goldman, De Blasio Re-Election Bid Stresses Affordability, Not Inequality,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-31/deblasio-re-election-bid-stresses-affordability-not-inequality.
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introduced a major housing plan, proposing initiatives to develop and/or
preserve 200,000 units of affordable housing.149 The program, controversial
from its introduction, included a wide variety of approaches to the
challenge of affordable housing, including: (1) funding programs for
renovation and construction of new housing; (2) “inclusionary zoning”
requirements for developers, giving them “density bonuses” for including
affordable housing in projects; and (3) zoning law changes to eliminate
barriers to development and allow for higher-density development in some
areas.150 Among the areas of regulation the administration proposed to reexamine were “parking requirements, zoning envelope constraints, and
restrictions on the transferability of development rights.”151
Mayor de Blasio’s housing plan was immediately criticized by
affordable housing advocates, who complained that it did not produce
enough housing for low-income citizens and that the inclusionary zoning
requirements did not demand enough from real estate developers. 152 The
plan was also criticized by community planning boards across the city,
many of whom were concerned by the impact that higher-density
development would have on their communities. 153 “We want a mixedincome population . . . . We want parking for the seniors and for any new
buildings coming in,” stated a community board chair in the Bronx,
echoing concerns expressed by many regarding the impact of new
development. 154 Further, the Queens borough president stated that
community boards in many neighborhoods were worried that allowing
more development would result in the conversion of existing affordable
housing and dislocate current residents.155 According to one paper:
Community meetings have turned long and contentious, sometimes with
dozens of residents lining up to testify against the proposal. The
opposition ranges from concerns that more development will
bring gentrification and higher real estate costs that would displace some
149. BILL DE BLASIO & ALICIA GLEN, HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-YEAR
PLAN 5 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf. See also
Jennifer Fermino, Mayor de Blasio Unveils $41B Proposal to Develop 200,000 Units of Affordable
Housing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 5, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/politics/mayor-unveils-41b-affordable-housing-plan-article-1.1780018.
150. DE BLASIO & GLEN, supra note 149. at 9, 32, 71.
151. Id. at 10.
152. See, e.g., Vivian Yee & Mireya Navarro, Some See Risk in de Blasio’s Bid to Add Housing,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2FD0fKC.
153. Id.
154. Michael Gartland & Yoav Gonen, Sky-High Opposition: De Blasio Faces Revolt Over
Building Plan, N.Y. POST, Nov. 17, 2015, at 10.
155. Id.
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longtime residents to complaints that more density will overwhelm the
transit and school systems.156

More than three-quarters of the city’s community boards, and all five
of the borough boards (consisting of the chairs of the community boards
and political leaders) opposed de Blasio’s original plan. 157 Much of the
opposition focused on fears of higher-density development, loss of parking,
and neighborhood change. As a member of Community District 8 in
Queens stated, “[w]e are very concerned, as are people all over, that we do
not become a high-density neighborhood, full of people and crowds.”158
“To add 45 feet, no matter what you put in it—-you could put Mother
Theresa in it—-it still is a too-tall building,” said the co-chair of
Community Board 8 in Manhattan.159
In low-income neighborhoods, particularly those of color, community
leaders expressed concern that the mayor’s plan was a mechanism to open
their communities to gentrification and racial change. State Assemblyman
Charles Barron argued:
They’re going to tell you that unless there’s a diversity of incomes, we’re
not going to be able to build our economy. What this means, translated?
You need white folks down here. If you want to have an economy, you
need white folk here. If you want to get transit stuff, you need white folk
to come in. If you want to get a new school, you need white folk to come
in . . . They want to make this place look better, to gentrify it.160

In the end, despite the no votes of a majority of community planning
boards, the New York City Council approved an amended proposal in
2016. The revised proposal met some of the criticisms of the original,
significantly increasing developers’ inclusionary zoning requirements and
altering the income levels for new-housing eligibility. The de Blasio
administration organized a vocal and influential coalition of labor
organizations and advocacy groups to argue that the proposal would

156. Josh Dawsey, New York City Zoning Plan is Under Fire, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2015, 8:20
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-zoning-plan-is-under-fire-1449277801.
157. Michael M. Grynbaum & Mireya Navarro, Mayor de Blasio Seeks to Rebuild Momentum for
Affordable Housing Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2uwXdXH; Ed Garcia Conde,
NYC Council Has a Big Opportunity to Do the Right Thing, WELCOME 2 BRONX (Feb. 10, 2016),
https://www.welcome2thebronx.com/2016/02/10/nyc-council-has-a-big-opportunity-to-do-the-rightthing.
158. Savitch-Lew, supra note 1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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significantly increase the amount of affordable housing in the city.161
But the fight against increased density and other zoning reforms is far
from over. In order to spur housing development, the administration must
now undertake the task of “re-zoning” individual neighborhoods for new
development. Community planning boards will have more opportunities to
oppose these plans. Although the first rezoning, in the East New York
section of Brooklyn, was approved, the administration will continue to face
significant challenges managing public participation in the process of
zoning approval.162
Opposition to increased density has also stalled housing plans in
Seattle and San Francisco, two cities with among the highest housing costs
in the country. In Seattle, Mayor Ed Murray had to disavow his
administration’s draft housing plan, which proposed allowing multi-family
dwellings in many of the city’s single-family zones.163 In San Francisco, a
plan by Mayor Ed Lee, permitting developers to build two stories higher
than zoning allowed in return for making 30 percent of the units affordable
for middle-income families, also faced significant opposition from
neighborhood advocates.164
America’s largest cities play an outsized role in the U.S. economy,
with “[t]he combined annual gross product of the country’s 10 largest
metropolitan areas [being] greater than the combined GDP of 36 states.”165
Between 2012 and 2015, more than 90 percent of the new jobs created in
the country were located in its largest urban areas.166 As a result of this
economic power, migration to these areas will continue, and thus they will
also continue to be challenged by housing shortages. At the same time,
growth pressures will continue to play a major role in urban politics, as
current residents push back against new development. Developing
161. J. David Goodman & Mireya Navarro, New York City Council Backs Affordable Housing
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2mVgx7W.
162. See Erin Durkin, City Council Passes Mayor de Blasio's Zoning Plan to Transform
Brooklyn’s East New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 20, 2016, 10:20 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/city-council-passes-plan-transform-brooklyn-zonearticle-1.2609215.
163. Daniel DeMay, Murray: No Changes to Single-Family Zones, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER: SEATTLE POL. (July 29, 2015, 3:08 PM), https://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/
2015/07/29/mayor-wont-pursue-changes-to-single-family-zones.
164. J.K. Dineen, Uphill Battle for Housing Bonus Plan, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/san-francisco-chronicle-late-edition/20160225/282226599798937.
165. Reid Wilson, Cities Drive the U.S. Economy: Here’s Proof, in One Map, WASH. POST:
GOVBEAT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://wapo.st/1hQ3JZs.
166. Id.
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mechanisms to support additional housing, particularly for low- and
middle-income residents, is crucial to the success of America’s largest
cities, and it is a problem that must be confronted by restructuring the
spheres of influence in the land regulatory system.
III. LAND USE IN CHINESE CITIES: CONCEPT, MECHANISM, AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
As in the U.S., urban planning in China has contributed to the
exclusion of middle- and low-income populations from first-tier cities—
Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen in particular. The urban planning policy is
pro-growth and business-friendly, but not necessarily pro-consumer. As the
primary landowner, city governments are the major players in the Chinese
real estate market. Although middle- and low-income populations provide
the labor upon which cities rely, local government preferences are for
profit-making and revenue-generating businesses, and their reluctance to
provide public goods (e.g., education, health care, and transportation) to
serve those populations has shaped government priorities and resulted in
housing shortages.
Government-led, property-owner-focused planning has excluded the
poor and the young from the first-tier cities in which the most promising
career opportunities are concentrated. Primarily, and most directly, poor
and young people cannot afford to live in big cities. City governments also
squeeze them out by limiting their access to schools, health care, and other
services. Secondarily, skyrocketing housing prices have fostered private
property consciousness in China, with private property owners—somewhat
ironically—joining the governments’ efforts to exclude newcomers, partly
because of perceived competition for services. Furthermore, like their
counterparts in American megacities, property owners are increasingly
sensitive to property value changes. The NIMBY phenomenon has come to
China!
The remainder of this Part is structured as follows. Section A sketches
out the concept and structure of urban planning in China and discusses how
it has become a powerful weapon in the hands of growth machine elites.
Section B discusses the establishment of urban planning commissions, with
members from outside the government, as an effort to democratize the
decision-making process, as well as the limitations of this initiative.
Finally, Section C discusses the rise of public participation in Chinese
urban planning and describes how democratization has made Chinese
megacities more exclusionary. The three factors have combined to promote
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exclusion in Chinese megacities.
A. PLANNING FOR GROWTH (FOR SOME)
Leading political scientists and economists refer to China’s
governmental structure as “market-preserving federalism.” 167 Under the
country’s economic reforms, city and county governments have been given
greater autonomy and incentives to manage their own economies, with
competition encouraged among them. City and county governments rely on
two financial resources: enterprise income tax and land sale revenue.168 The
enterprise revenue framework makes industrial development the top
priority of Chinese cities. The land sale framework, which links the
operation of local governments to their ability to sell land at high prices,
pushes government decisions toward high-value projects, resulting in
exclusion.
The urban planning structure in China is complicated, but it can
generally be divided into two layers: a comprehensive or “master plan,”
and a detailed plan.169 “The master plan outlines the general land uses of
the city, while the detailed plan is prepared for the area that faces
immediate construction or is specified in the master plan,” and is similar to
zoning in American cities.170 The comprehensive plans of megacities such
as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen are prepared by city governments and
approved by the State Council (i.e., the Chinese central government). 171
Under party leadership, decisions are made by city leaders—usually the
city party secretary and mayor—in consultation with other government
officials, urban planning experts, and related business interests.172 Detailed
plans govern individual land use decisions and are prepared by the urban
planning administration and approved by the city government.173
Comprehensive city plans are more akin to economic plans,

167. Hills & Qiao, supra note 20, at 177.
168. See id. at 191 & n.95.
169. FULONG WU, PLANNING FOR GROWTH: URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN CHINA 59
(2015).
170. Id.
171. 中华人民共和国城乡规划法 [Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), art. 14.
172. See, e.g., Kui Xiong, Political Analysis of Power Structures in Urban Planning Process:
Based on Shanghai Urban Planning Institutions and Practices in the 1990s, at 81–84 (2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tongji University) (on file with author).
173. 中华人民共和国城乡规划法 [Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic of
China], art. 19.
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incorporating strategic positioning, industrial development, population
control, infrastructure construction, and other priorities over a twenty-year
horizon.174 In China, such plans are always growth-oriented. For example,
the Shanghai City Master Plan (1999–2020) includes sixteen sections
covering the scope of city development, goals, directions, industrial
development, transportation, and residential development plans.175 The goal
of city development, according to the plan, is to make Shanghai an
international center for finance and trade, and urban planning is directed
toward achieving that goal. 176 The comprehensive plans of Beijing and
Shenzhen share a similar structure and a clear focus on economic and city
growth.177
Together, these comprehensive and detailed plans determine who can
live in Chinese megacities, and they focus on attracting highly educated
professionals such as engineers, lawyers, investors, and investment
bankers. 178 Those with fewer skills enjoy limited provision in the plans
because local governments set population control goals that are often too
low. For example, in its comprehensive plan for 2004–2020, the Beijing
municipal government planned for a total population of 18 million by
2020. 179 However, the city’s total population exceeded 19 million by
2010.180 Similarly, in its comprehensive plan for 1999–2020, the Shanghai
municipal government forecast a population of 18.5 million by 2020,
whereas the city’s total population in 2013 was already more than 24
million.181 Such population targets shape land use decisions by pretending
174. See WU, supra note 169, at 59.
175. 上海市城市总体规划（1999 年–2020 年）[Shanghai City Master Plan (1999–2020)]
(Dec. 4, 2003), http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2319/nw10800/nw11407/nw12941/
u26aw1100.html.
176. Id.
177. See 北京市城市总体规划 (2016 年–2035 年) [Beijing City Master Plan (2016–2035)],
http://zhengwu.beijing.gov.cn/gh/dt/t1494703.htm (Sept. 29, 2017); 深圳总体规划获批 10 年后人口
低于 1100 万 [Shenzhen Comprehensive Plans Approved According to Which Its Total Population
Should be Under 11 Million in 10 Years], SHENZHEN NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 24, 2010, 7:46 AM),
http://www.sznews.com/finance/content/2010-08/24/content_4860257.htm.
178. See 北京市人民政府办公厅关于印发《北京市积分落户管理办法（试行）》的通知
[Administrative Measures for the Settlement of Beijing Hukou Points] (2016),
http://zhengce.beijing.gov.cn/library/192/33/50/438650/79206/index.html; 年上海积分落户政策 [The
Policies of Hukou Points in Shanghai, 2017], HUKOU SHANGHAI, https://web.archive.org/web/
20170826093541/http://www.hukoushanghai.com/lhsh/907.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).
179. 北 京 市 城 市 总 体 规 划 缘 何 “ 短 命 ” ？ [Why Is Beijing’s Master Plan “Short-Lived”?],
PEOPLE (June 6, 2011, 8:43 PM), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/14830221.html.
180. Id.
181. Yi Huiyun, 京沪启动新一轮城市规划编修：计划赶不上变化 [New-Round Amendment of
Urban Planning Gets Started in Beijing and Shanghai: Plan May Not Be Able to Keep up with
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that housing demand is smaller than it actually is.
Shenzhen is probably the most extreme case, with a planned
population that lags far behind its actual population growth. In the city’s
first comprehensive plan, the estimated population for 2000 was 840,000, a
figure that was already far exceeded by 1994, when the population reached
1.5 million. In the second comprehensive plan, issued in 1996, the
projected population for 2010 was 4.3 million, whereas Shenzhen’s
population in 2000 stood at 7 million.182 The city is currently home to more
than 15 million people, although its current plan estimates a population of
just 11 million by 2020.183 The population targets in these plans determine
the planning of public transportation, public utilities, schools, hospitals, the
police force, and many other public goods crucial to city functioning.
Public services in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen have been planned in a
way that is never going to meet the demands of their rapidly expanding
populations, as evidenced by their public transportation systems, which are
severely crowded relative to those of New York.184
Detailed plans are used as a way to regulate land development and
control the location and density of real estate projects, but they are not
necessarily opposed to development. The success of individual projects
depends on whether they serve planned city development goals or the
preferences of city leaders. Newspaper reports on corrupt local government
leaders often reveal the way in which they have used urban planning to
facilitate their idiosyncratic ideas about urban development and/or favor
one or a few developers to help them realize those ideas.185 Research on

Changes], SINA FIN. (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:58 AM), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20140403/
015818695993.shtml.
182. See 深圳市城市总体规划 (1996–2010) [Shenzhen Master Plan (1996–2010)], SHENZHEN
NEWS (June 8, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.sznews.com/news/content/2013-06/08/content_8159168_
3.htm.
183. 深圳总体规划获批 10 年后人口低于 1100 万 [Shenzhen City Master Plan Receives
Approval, and the Population Is Projected to Be Less than 11 Million in 10 Years], SHENZHEN NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2010, 7:46 AM), http://www.sznews.com/finance/content/2010-08/24/content_4860257.htm.
184. See Tania Branigan, Riding Beijing’s Subway End to End: 88km of Queues and Crushes on a
20p Ticket, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2014, 7:51 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/
2014/sep/10/-sp-beijing-subway-china-metro-queues-ticket-investment (“Each day 9.75 million
passengers ride the lines across Beijing: nearly three times as many as take the London Tube and twice
as many as use the New York system.”). See also, e.g., Daozu Bao, Shanghai Metro Hires People to
Shove
Commuters
into
Trains,
CHINA
DAILY
(Feb.
4,
2010,
8:40
AM)
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/04/content_9425324.htm; Kevin McGeary, Shenzhen
Subway Line to Add Shuttle Trains During Rush Hours, NANFANG (Jan. 18, 2013, 7:00 AM),
https://thenanfang.com/shenzhen-subway-line-to-add-trains-during-rush-hours.
185. See, e.g., 从宿迁到昆明：商人刘卫高的“地”国 [From Suqian to Kunming: The “Land”
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Beijing concluded that when a zoning amendment was directly ordered by
a government leader, it had greater than 90 percent likelihood of approval.
Compared with factors such as development density, location, and the
nature of a project, government leaders’ instructions were the most
significant factor in determining the result of zoning amendments,
according to the same study.186
B. URBAN PLANNING COMMISSIONS AS PART OF THE GROWTH MACHINE
To combat the arbitrariness of government-led development decisions,
many Chinese cities have established urban planning commissions.
Shenzhen was the first city to experiment with such a commission in 1998;
this subsequently became a model for other. The Shenzhen Urban Planning
Commission enjoys the power to review comprehensive plans and to
approve detailed control plans (i.e., zoning maps). It has twenty-nine
members, fourteen of them government officials, with the mayor serving as
chair. The other government members are directors of relevant bureaus and
urban district presidents. The fifteen non-government members are
professors, real estate professionals and managers, urban planners, public
utility company managers, and other community members. Decisions must
be approved by two-thirds of attending members and no fewer than half the
total number of commission members.187
Such strict procedures are designed to confer legitimacy upon urban
planning in Shenzhen. In theory, the rules are supposed to prevent the
government or political leaders from dominating the planning process. In
reality, however, the non-government commission members primarily raise
easily resolved technical issues. Few people in the city would seriously
challenge a project that city leaders had decided to push through. The nongovernmental members of the commission are selected to represent the
general public interest, rather than special or particular interests. 188 The
Empire of Businessman Weigao Liu], SINA NEWS (Mar. 19, 2015, 9:32 AM),
http://news.sina.com.cn/zl/zatan/2015-03-19/09323406.shtml; Shen Fan Cui Xiankang, 受贿超 2400 万
云南原副书记仇和获刑 14 年半 [The Former Deputy Secretary In Yunnan, Qiu Ji, Accepted Bribes
for Over RMB 24 Million and Was Sentenced to a Prison Term of 6 Months and 14 Years], CAIXIN
(Dec. 12, 2016, 5:28 PM), http://china.caixin.com/2016-12-15/101027333.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2017).
186. Linmao Xia, Analysis on the Technical and Political Factors of the Regulatory Detailed
Planning Alteration in Beijing 78 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tsinghua University) (on file
with author);
187. Yuefeng Chen, Legal Control Over City Planning Power: A Realistic Perspective 112 (2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Shanghai Jiaotong University) (on file with author).
188. 深 圳 市 城 市 规 划 委 员 会 章 程 [Charter of Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission]
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Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission is thus not designed as a forum for
bargaining by various stakeholders, although in reality members from the
real estate industry frequently promote their sector’s agenda in the name of
public interest.189
Even such limited public participation proved intolerable to the
Shenzhen city government, with officials viewing it as too time-consuming
and inefficient. From their perspective, city development could not wait for
extensive reviews and discussions within the commission.190 As a result,
the city government revised its urban planning regulations in 2001 and
redrafted the Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission Charter.191 The reform
provided for smaller special commissions—most notably the Commission
on Zoning Maps, which is charged with approving detailed plans and any
variations to them. This commission comprises nineteen members, nine of
whom are also government employees of the Shenzhen Urban Planning,
Land, and Resources Commission, a super-government bureau combining
the powers of land administration and urban planning. Among the other ten
members are urban planners and engineers from the Shenzhen Urban
Planning Institute and other public institutions, environmental and
agricultural officials, a professor from Shenzhen University, and a real
estate appraiser. Given that nine of its members are from the Urban
Planning, Land, and Resources Commission and some of its nongovernmental members are closely associated with them, the Commission
on Zoning Maps is clearly dominated by the government, and has become
an efficient agency for implementing city leaders’ business plans. 192 In
addition, faced with an increasing number of cases, the Shenzhen
government has delegated part of its power to approve zoning amendments
to the urban district planning bureaus to achieve greater efficiency.193

(promulgated by the Shenzhen Urb. Plan. Comm’n, Aug. 1, 2002, effective Aug. 1, 2002), arts. 18, 27,
http://www.szpl.gov.cn/szupb/zcfg_6712/czgc/201105/t20110506_457328.html; Yuefeng Chen, supra
note 187, at 106.
189. Yuefeng Chen, supra note 187, at 107.
190. Interview with a former Shenzhen urban planning pfficial (Jan. 10, 2017) (transcript on file
with author).
191. 深圳市城市规划委员会章程 [Charter of Shenzhen Urban Planning Commission], art. 12;
吴丹 (Dan Wu), 深圳市存量土地背景下控规管理机制研究-以控规局部调整为例(A Study of
Regulatory Control Plans in Urban Redevelopment in Shenzhen: Partial Adjustments as an Example)
11–13 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
192. Interview with Dan Wu (October 6, 2015).
193. See, e.g., 罗湖城市更新快得想不到 原因就是改革放权 [Unbelievable Pace of Urban
Renewal in Luohu: The Reason is Reform and Devolution of Power], SHENZHEN NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017,
9:08 AM), http://dc.sznews.com/content/2017-02/15/content_15278331_2.htm.

506

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:467

What we see in the Shenzhen case is a tradeoff between legitimacy
and efficiency. Even a limited broadening of public participation reduced
decision-making efficiency, and thus found itself in tension with city
development. As the primary suppliers of land for housing, city
governments in China also try to maximize their profits from the land
market. Because most local government functions are funded through land
sales, the land price that governments can secure is crucial to their
sustainability. City governments thus create a “hungry supply” (i.e., an
insufficient supply that is never able to catch up with demand) to push up
land and housing prices in order to harvest monopoly rents from the
market. The resulting skyrocketing housing prices have made the lives of
cities’ middle- and low-income populations very difficult and, in many
cases, pushed them out while also excluding potential incomers.
To further reduce housing supply and drive up housing prices, city
governments strictly control residential development density. According to
urban planning rules, the highest floor-area ratio (“FAR”) for residential
plots in Beijing is 2.8. 194 The corresponding figures for Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are 2.5, 195 3.0, 196 and 6.0, respectively. 197 In
comparison, the residential FAR in New York City can be 10 or even
higher. 198 The first reason for city governments to limit residential
development density is that they are concerned that high-rise residential
buildings will attract too many residents, thereby exceeding the capacity of
public facilities. The second reason is that they wish to control the total
amount of available housing on the market in order to maintain high
housing prices and, in turn, the high land prices which are crucial to
government land-sales revenue. Let us think about a simple illustration.
Suppose that a city mayor decides that the total amount of housing units
should be limited to 1,000 during his term—the mayor can then choose to
194. 关于加强北京市城市建设节约用地标准管理的若干规定 [Stipulations on Strengthening
Urban Construction Land Use Control Standards] (promulgated by the Beijing Mun. People’s Gov’t,
effective March 24, 2008), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6808.
195. 上 海 市 城 市 规 划 管 理 技 术 规 定 [Shanghai Urban Planning Administration Technical
Regulations] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun. People’s Gov’t, Oct. 18, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004),
http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2319/nw2407/nw12939/u26aw972.html.
196. 广 州 市 城 乡 规 划 技 术 规 定 [Guangzhou City Urban and Rural Planning Technical
Regulations] (promulgated by the Guangzhou Mun. People’s Gov’t, Oct. 19, 2015, effective Jan. 1,
2016), http://www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s8263/201512/731366b75b7c4c11af46b24c8550412c.shtml.
197. 深圳市城市规划标准与准则 [Shenzhen Urban Planning Standards and Rules] (promulgated
by the Shenzhen Mun. People’s Gov’t, effective Jan. 1, 2014) http://www.zzguifan.com/webarbs/
book/52416/955629.shtml.
198. Residence Districts: Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLAN., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/
planning/zoning/districts-tools/residence-districts-r1-r10.page (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
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sell 200 plots of land with a FAR of 5, or 500 plots of land with a FAR of
2. The 200 plots of land may sell at a higher price per plot than the 500
plots of land. But considering two additional factors, the total land sales
revenue from the former is actually less than the latter: first, low-density
housing is of higher price per unit; second, low-density housing puts much
less burden on public infrastructure. Moreover, city governments always
choose to sell more land rather than increase FAR, given their power to
take land from farmers, with compensation equal to the agricultural value,
and sell it to developers at a much higher price, reflecting the development
value.199
Real estate developers do lobby city governments for more density
after they buy land from them. Like their counterparts in many other
countries, real estate developers also invest in relationships with
government officials, sometimes building up corrupt ties. However, even
considering ex post adjustments and imperfect compliance, land use
regulations in China still impose a highly restrictive constraint on urban
land development. A recent empirical study investigated land developers’
compliance with FAR, using a unique set of 854 pairs of land parcels and
corresponding residential development projects across thirty major Chinese
cities. In 181 of these 854 cases, the land developers exceeded the
regulatory upper limits set when the land parcels were acquired. “The
developers adjusted the FAR upward in 21.2% of all the cases, covering
approximately 25.2% of the total land area developed. . . . Including all 854
cases, the total ﬂoor area was increased by 4.3% beyond the total
regulatory limit due to upward adjustments of FAR.” 200 The study also
estimated that “there exists a signiﬁcant gap between the FAR that
maximizes the market land value and the regulatory FAR. . . ; “[c]orruption
may facilitate an upward adjustment and reduce the gap, but only
modestly.” 201 Overall, this first empirical study “suggests that FAR
regulations have imposed a highly restrictive constraint on China’s urban
land development even in the absence of strict compliance.”202
Detailed plans also determine the ratios of industrial, commercial, and
residential land. On average, industrial land occupies more than 20 percent
of total buildable land in Chinese cities, a much greater percentage than in

199. See Qiao, supra note 39, at 103.
200. Hongbin Cai et al., To Build Above the Limit? Implementation of Land Use Regulations in
Urban China, 98 J. URB. ECON. 223, 223–24 (2017).
201. Id. at 224.
202. Id.
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other countries. 203 From 2009 to 2014, twelve major Chinese cities—
including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen—zoned more than
40 percent of their annual land supply for industrial use.204 Chinese cities
have thus seen too much land zoned for industrial development and too
little for residential development. Moreover, the development density of
industrial land is often very low. According to the Chinese Ministry of
Land and Resources, the FAR of industrial land in Chinese cities is about
0.8, on average, whereas the figure ranges from 1.0–2.0 in developed
countries. 205 Partial reasons include the unexamined assumptions that
industrial companies require large factories and that it is infeasible to move
large machines to tall buildings, although in many cases neither is true:
many industrial companies do not require large machinery, and it is not
always difficult to install such machinery in high-rises, as evidenced by
Hong Kong and other places in which land is used more efficiently. 206
However, industrial investors have no incentive to make more efficient or
intensive use of land that is assigned to them by the government cheaply, or
even at no cost. A comparison of industrial land prices and the prices of
other types of land reveals industrial land to be, on average, about one-sixth
the price of residential land in 105 major Chinese cities.207
In conclusion, the growth machine of Chinese cities is sufficiently
powerful to control the decision-making processes of land use, and cities
use that power to maximize land sale revenues and promote economic
growth based on industrial development. The result has been a limited
housing supply and controlled residential development density, which in
turn contribute to skyrocketing housing prices and the exclusion of lowerend housing consumers from megacities.
C. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: THE SLOW RISE OF A MOVEMENT
China’s reforms have maintained the political structure of the party
state while liberating the economic sector, allowing individuals to own
housing and hold land use rights within a system of strict government
control. In the wake of economic development and urbanization, though,
203. See GUOJIN QI ET AL., 关于银行不良资产包涉及抵押工业地产的收购处置调研报告
[RESEARCH REPORT ON THE ACQUISITION AND DISPOSITION OF NON-PERFORMING BANKING ASSETS
INCLUDING MORTGAGED INDUSTRIAL REAL ESTATE] (2015), http://www.coamc.com.cn/dfzch/jtyf/
ywtt/201508/P020150812561751803967.pdf.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
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city management became more complicated, and the interests of various
parties within a city are increasingly interconnected. Urban planning
decisions increasingly affect the lives of property owners; combined with
growing awareness of and sensitivity to property values, this has led to
greater public participation in urban planning decisions. The Chinese
central government’s role in this system is complex. Although supportive
of local government autonomy, the central government sees public
participation as a way of constraining abuses of power by local officials. As
early as 2000, the then-Minister of Construction, Yu Zhensheng,
emphasized the importance of public participation to urban planning.208 In
2006, the Ministry of Construction promulgated urban planning ordinances
that made public participation a principle of urban planning. The ministry
also stipulated that urban planning drafts and detailed plan amendments
must be open to public opinion and publicize the results of public surveys
before the approval process could be completed.209
At the local level, city governments view public participation as a way
of promoting public acceptance of urban planning decisions, partly in
response to bottom-up pressure. For example, the 2003 revision to the
Shanghai’s urban planning regulations highlighted the importance of public
participation and made listening to public opinion an urban planning
requirement.210 More specifically, it required the city’s planning agency to
publish detailed plans and organize meetings and hearings before
submitting those plans for approval. The rules also stipulate that the city
government should report to the city-level People’s Congress or its
standing committee annually to strengthen the monitoring of urban
planning. 211 In the same year, Beijing’s urban planning committee also
made an effort to institutionalize public participation practices by
promulgating the Beijing City Interim Rules on Urban Planning
Publicity. 212 From November to December 2004, the committee also
208. Huajian Zhong, 俞正声部长告诫大城市一把手：城市规划公开才能遏制腐败 [Minister
Yu Zhengshen Warned Leaders of Big Cities: Only Public Urban Planning Can Contain Corruption],
Urban Planning Communication, No. 23, at 3 (2000).
209. See ZHENYU CHEN, 城市规划中的公众参与程序研究 [A RESEARCH ON THE PROCESS
RELATED TO PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN URBAN PLANNING] 42–43 (2009).
210. See 上海市城市规划条例(2003 修正), [Shanghai Municipal Regulations of Urban Planning
(amended 2003)] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun. People’s Cong. Standing Comm., Nov. 13,
2003), art. 26, http://www.shqyg.com/renda/cwhgb/node185/userobject1ai609.html.
211. See id., arts. 17–19.
212. See 北京市城市规划公示管理暂行办法 [Beijing City Interim Rules on Urban Planning
Publicity] (promulgated by the Beijing City Gov’t Comm. of Urb. Plan., Nov. 7, 2003, abolished Jan. 1,
2009).
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publicized its draft of the revised Beijing City Comprehensive Plan to
solicit public opinion. 213 In 2006, Shenzhen followed suit, again
emphasizing the importance of public participation by soliciting public
opinion on its comprehensive plan for 2020. It even changed the strategic
positioning of several urban districts in response to public opinion.214
These local initiatives culminated in the incorporation of public
participation in the country’s 2007 Urban and Rural Planning Law
(“URPL”), which for the first time established a national legal framework
for such participation in urban planning.215 Article 26 of the URPL states
that drafting agencies should make drafts of comprehensive plans available
to the public for at least thirty days and organize meetings, discussions,
hearings, or other forums to solicit both experts and public opinion.216 The
agencies should then consider such opinions carefully and attach a relevant
report in their submissions for approval. Recent changes to the URPL have
given neighbors more influence over development decisions than they
enjoyed in the past. The current rules require agencies proposing a zoning
amendment to solicit the opinions of “parties of interest” (“PoIs”) in the
area. They also conclude that detailed control plans—which impose
specific restrictions on land development—directly affect the interests of
those parties, and therefore their opinions are required before
modification. 217 Another section of the URPL establishes the same
requirement for variations to detailed building plans, and require that PoIs
be compensated where zoning variances result in property value losses.218
These stipulations in the URPL signal significant progress in public
participation in Chinese urban planning. However, the limitations are also
quite apparent. Comprehensive plans are often too broad and vague for
meaningful public participation, whereas detailed control plans and zoning
variations are limited to PoIs with a clear entitlement and specific interest

213. See Peng Xinqiong, 北 京 城 市 总 体 规 划 （ 2004–2020 年 ） 昨 起 公 示 [Beijing City
Comprehensive Plan 2004–2020 Publicized Yesterday], NEWS 163 (Nov. 7, 2004, 2:09 AM),
http://news.163.com/41107/2/14I5OQSA0001124T.html.
214. See Bing Zou et al., 从咨询公众到共同决策—深圳市城市总体规划全过程公众参与的实
践与启示 [From Public Consultation to Joint Decision-Making: Practice and Implications of Public
Participation in the Process of the Shenzhen Comprehensive Urban Plan], 35 CITY PLAN. REV. 91, 91–
96 (2011).
215. See 中华人民共和国城乡规划法 [Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic
of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008).
216. Id. art. 26.
217. Id. art. 48.
218. Id. art. 50.
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in judicial or administrative procedures.219
1. Impotent Public Participation in Comprehensive Plan Formulation
As discussed above, comprehensive plans focus on the strategic
positioning, grand goals, and plans of a city. They are drafted by
professional urban planners, and are often too complex for individual
participation. They represent the intention and will of city leaders, to be
implemented by urban planners and legitimated to some extent by a veneer
of public participation. It is argued here that public participation faces three
main problems in drafting comprehensive plans.
First, the timing of public participation comes quite late in the process.
According to the URPL, public opinion should be solicited before the draft
plan is submitted for approval. In other words, the plan has been drafted
before any public input, and the public has limited options for making
substantial changes to it. The drafting agency does not usually expect any
overhaul of its draft plan. Urban planners use their own models,
mechanisms, and terms in drafting comprehensive plans, and do not expect
laypersons to understand the process, let alone engage in any meaningful
participation. Individual complaints are often rejected with reference to the
“science” of comprehensive plans and the interconnectedness of a city’s
various goals within those plans.
Second, comprehensive plans are generally too broad and too vague to
foster substantial public participation. The URPL reflects a lack of clarity
regarding the purpose of participation as well as who should participate.
The URPL offers no clear definition of who constitutes the public in law—
which means that anyone can participate in theory, but only certain
members of the public have the capacity and motivation to engage in the
process in practice. This lack a clearly defined explicit entitlement to public
participation also results in a lack of structure for that participation. The
primary avenue of participation—as in the U.S.—is public hearings.
However, there are no clear rules for public hearings in China. Given the
lack of guidance on who should participate, public hearings often turn into
a public show put on by local government officials and the urban planning
experts they invite. Hence, public participation is largely symbolic,
especially given that members of the public are often less interested in

219. See, e.g., 定安县人民政府与定安金地建设开发有限公司规划行政管理上诉案 [People’s
Gov. of Ding’an Cty. v. Ding’an Jindi Constr. & Dev. Co.] (Hainan High People’s Ct. 2016),
http://openlaw.cn/pdf/judgement/b25f8d1c215d453d94c32965ad6f94bf.
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comprehensive plans than they are in specific neighborhood projects.220
Finally, the URPL is unclear about the consequences of neglecting the
public participation requirement. It simply requires a drafting agency to
submit a report responding to public opinion without specifying any
consequences sufficient to force meaningful participation. For all of these
reasons, the so-called public participation movement has not lead to better
urban planning. Nor has it changed the administrative-driven nature of
urban planning or counterbalanced the influence of growth machine elites.
2. Zoning Maps and Adjustments: Housing Owners as Parties of Interest
In contrast to the lack of clarity surrounding “the public,” PoIs have
specific rights, including the right to request information on construction
projects that might affect their interests and the right to initiate
administrative (and even private) litigation if their property rights are
violated.221 Both administrative and judicial agencies in China equate PoIs
with housing owners. If you own an apartment in a neighboring area, you
are by definition a PoI; if you do not, you cannot be a PoI.222 Considering
that PoIs were already the most active participants in the drafting of
comprehensive plans, the more specific rights and procedures they have
been granted at the detailed-plan level afford them even greater power
relative to non-property owners. However, PoIs in China are still not
satisfied by the administrative and judicial protection of their property
interests, and often engage in public protests when these interests are
challenged. As a result, the limited progress achieved in public
participation has been dominated by this rising class of property owners,
who are sensitive to anything likely to diminish the value of their property,
whether it be the rezoning of public land or open space as residential land
or just the simple addition of more housing to their neighborhood.
Accordingly, housing development in China’s megacities has become even
more difficult to achieve than before, and urban planning decisions are
220. See generally Guangxin Liu & Yanwen Liu, 论城市规划过程中的公众参与 [On Public
Participation in Urban Planning], 8 THEORETICAL RES. URB. CONSTRUCTION 1 (2013); Yanfen Ye, 论
城市规划过程中的公众参与问题 [On the Problem of Public Participation in the Process of Urban
Planning], 13 ECON. VISION 390 (2013). This is also consistent with Carol Rose’s critique of master
plans. See Rose, supra note 68, at 875.
221. 中华人民共和国城乡规划法 [Urban and Rural Planning Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008), arts. 9, 48, 60.
222. See, e.g., 唐小红诉苏州市规划局规划许可纠纷案 [Xiaohong Tang v. Planning Bureau of
Suzhou City] (Canglang District People’s Ct. 2007); Chenwei Ji, 论行政诉讼中城市规划利害关系人
的判定 [On the Judgment of Urban Planning Stakeholders in Administrative Litigation], 32 LEGAL F.
70 (2017).
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increasingly facing challenges.223
For example, within the past decade the central government has
developed a major plan for the construction of affordable housing and
ordered city governments to build a certain amount of such housing in their
jurisdictions. To avoid concentrating the poor in particular neighborhoods
and districts, the Ministry of Construction has further promoted a mixture
of affordable housing with regular commercial residential housing.
However, these efforts have been met with a number of challenges from
existing property owners. For instance, a 2008 affordable housing proposal
in the Xu Jiahui district of Shanghai was originally planned for a central
area, to promote the integration of people from different social and
economic backgrounds and to avoid the segregation of rich and poor. The
proposal passed with little difficulty (probably due in part to limited public
participation), but once the project got underway, more than 6,000
households in the neighboring residential district rose up in protest. 224
These property owners first argued that the project would occupy land that
had originally been planned for a healthcare facility, senior center, and
kindergarten. In response, the government explained that those public
facilities would be included in the affordable housing project and open to
all of those living nearby. The property owners then claimed that the
project might influence the natural light and air quality in the
neighborhood. What was their real concern? As one resident explained in
the aftermath, “We were concerned that low prices and [a] low-income
population would pull down housing prices [in] the three [surrounding]
neighborhoods.” 225 The pressure that property owners exerted through
institutional channels, such as the local People’s Political Consultative
Conference, resulted in the Shanghai city government relocating the project
to a more remote area.226
This case illustrates the national debate over the concept of mixed
living for the rich and poor (pinfu hunju). The Ministry of Housing and
Urban-Rural Development promotes such mixed living, requiring real
estate developers to incorporate a certain percentage of affordable housing
223. See, e.g., Yang Jian, 改规划乱规划无规划 政绩驱使致城市规划乱象频出 [Problematic
Urban Planning Motivated by Political Achievement], PEOPLE (Dec. 13, 2013, 8:23 AM),
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/1213/c1004-23830135.html.
224. Jia Lunong, 上海市中心建经适房遭附近业主联合抵制 [The Construction of Economically
Affordable Housing in the Downtown Shanghai Faces Boycott from Nearby Property Owners], SINA
NEWS (Aug. 17, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-08-17/010020910222.shtml.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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into their projects to avoid concentrations of the poor in particular regions.
However, both real estate developers and high-income residents have
expressed opposition to this policy. As one such resident from Lanzhou in
Gansu province explained, “I paid a large amount of money for housing
exactly for its environment and surroundings; it’s good for us and for our
children’s education.”227 Property owners’ concerns over property values,
which are inseparable from existing neighborhood characteristics, have
contributed to the rise of the NIMBY movement in China. It has become
increasingly common for middle-class property owners to challenge urban
planning decisions, sometimes through public protests. NIMBY
movements across the country have forced local governments to take
existing property owners’ interests more seriously, though the political and
social impact of such movements on Chinese urban governance is yet to be
fully examined. 228 To date, the movement has attracted public attention
primarily with respect to environmental issues, as in the case of opposition
to the construction of nearby chemical factories or garbage-disposal
sites.229
Community opposition thus far has been separate from public
participation. Unlike their American counterparts, local communities in
China have little institutional power in the urban planning process. Under
Chinese law, public participation is incapable of accommodating and
dealing with community opposition, which is why such opposition is
mainly presented politically, in the form of public protest. However, such
protests have proved a powerful weapon in slowing down governmentplanned development projects, owing to the government’s concern with
social stability.230 Overall, the NIMBY movement in China has not made
cities more inclusive, but rather has strengthened the government’s already
existing inclination to exclude newcomers who would impose a burden on
public services or create a nuisance for neighboring property owners.
The voices of newcomers and citizens without property are completely
227. See Xiao Wenxin & Li Kainan, 媒体调查称兰州高低收入者均不满贫富混居政策 [Those
with High or Low Incomes Are All Dissatisfied with the Policies of Mixed Rich and Poor Residences],
SINA NEWS (Oct. 8, 2010, 12:17 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-08-10/001720860323.shtml.
228. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 54, at 431; Sun, supra note 54, at 133, 136.
229. See, e.g., 近年新建大项目受到周边居民反对事件一览（包括 PX 事件） [Those Incidents
That Received Opposition from Nearby Residents in Recent Years (Including the PX Incident)], IFENG
(Sept. 20, 2014, 2:24 AM), http://finance.ifeng.com/a/20140920/13131025_0.shtml; Chen Yang, 东莞
樟木头上百村民散步抗议建垃圾焚烧厂 [Hundreds of Villagers Protested the Construction of a
Waste Incineration Plant in Zhangmutou, Dongguan], SOUTHCN (Mar. 29, 2010, 9:11 AM),
http://news.southcn.com/g/2010-03/29/content_10554085.htm.
230. Johnson, supra note 54, at 436; Sun, supra note 54, at 136.
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absent from the urban planning process. For example, bargaining in urban
renewal, which has become an increasingly important means of city
development, occurs primarily between growth machine elites—
government officials, real estate developers, and property owners—with
the interests of the majority of residents in blighted neighborhoods—
namely, renters—receiving little, if any, consideration. In Shenzhen, eight
million residents of intra-city villages (villages within the city) are
migrants, and most of their landlords do not live in those villages.231 When
intra-city villages are targeted for redevelopment, their migrant worker
residents (generally taxi drivers, factory workers, cleaning staff, security
guards, and the like) are forced to move to another village. 232 If the
Shenzhen government succeeds in redeveloping all such villages, migrant
workers will have nowhere to live.
To summarize, urban governance in China is dominated by growth
elites, including government officials who pursue industrial-driven
economic growth, financial investors, and real estate developers. The
decision-making mechanism is administratively driven and allows little
democratic deliberation or public input. The resulting growth machine has
little sympathy for the young and the poor. Combined with the
conventional hukou regime, land use regulations have become an
increasingly important weapon for Chinese cities to exclude the unwanted.
The rise of homeownership in China was supposed to balance the power of
local governments, but only to the limited extent of protecting existing
property owners’ interests. For the non-property owners in Chinese cities,
Chinese NIMBYism operates similarly to its U.S. counterpart, serving to
limit the housing supply and shore up housing prices by slowing down or
pushing out development.
IV. HOUSING, THE NEW EXCLUSION, AND THE WAY OUT
Our research reveals that two very different systems—with very
different legal frameworks, governmental structures, and goals—can each
produce exclusionary housing policies that limit the construction of
affordable housing where it is needed. The role of property owners in
preventing development has widespread implications for society that go far

231. Shitong Qiao, Planting Houses in Shenzhen: A Real Estate Market Without Legal Titles, 29
CANADIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 253, 258–66 (2014).
232. See Eli Mackinnon, The Twilight of Shenzhen’s Great Urban Village, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept.
16, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/16/china-demolition-economy-the-twilight-of-shenzhensgreat-urban-village-baishizhou.
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beyond the issues of exclusion and inconvenience for developers. In recent
years, a growing number of economists have begun to focus on the rapidly
escalating cost of housing in many American cities—particularly coastal
cities, where housing prices have risen dramatically—forcing many people
to relocate. Jason Furman, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
under President Obama, has written:
[S]ome land use regulations can be beneficial to communities and the
overall economy. There can be compelling environmental reasons in
some localities to limit high-density or multi-use development. . . . But
in other cases, zoning regulations and other local barriers to housing
development allow a small number of individuals to capture the
economic benefits of living in a community, thus limiting diversity and
mobility. The artificial upward pressure that zoning places on house
prices—primarily by functioning as a supply constraint—also may
undermine the market forces that would otherwise determine how much
housing to build, where to build, and what type to build, leading to a
mismatch between the types of housing that households want, what they
can afford, and what is available to buy or rent. 233

Furman’s analysis relies on the work of Edward Glaeser, Joseph
Gyorko, and Raven Saks, who concluded that zoning regulations in New
York City increase the cost of housing there by 50 percent.234 And high
housing costs, as Peter Ganong and Daniel Shoag have argued, are largely
responsible for hindering the migration of Americans from lower-wage to
higher-wage regions.235
In both the U.S. and China, the impact of overly restrictive
development approaches has contributed to gentrification, as consumers
seek housing in previously undesirable neighborhoods, with developers
following close behind. As John Mangin has argued, zoning restrictions
that prevent development in high-income areas push home-seekers to
expand their targets to adjacent neighborhoods. 236 The result is a rise in

233. Furman, supra note 8, at 2. See also Peter Ganong & Daniel Shoag, Why Has Regional
Income Convergence Declined? 1–4 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 21, 2016).
234. Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in
Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 359–60 (2005).
235. Ganong & Shoag, supra note 233, at 2. Of course, land use regulation is not the only factor
contributing to megacity housing shortages. For example, “[a]ccording to a recent study by Issi Romem,
chief economist at BuildZoom, part of the explanation lies in the geographic characteristics of cities and
metros—mountains, lakes, coastlines, etc.—that make it all but impossible to expand and add more
housing.”). Richard Florida, Blame Geography for High Housing Prices?, CITYLAB (Apr. 18, 2016),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2016/04/blame-geography-for-high-housing-prices/478680.
236. See Mangin, supra note 8, at 106.
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housing costs there, which attracts developers—and a backlash from longterm residents concerned about being priced out of the area. However,
efforts to stop development do little to prevent increases in housing costs,
which are the result of demand rather than construction.237
In the remainder of this Article, we first discuss some of the
commonalities and differences between the U.S. and China with regard to
land use regulation in fast-growing cities. We then discuss several
proposals made by other academics for dealing with exclusion in the
context of urban development, and argue for replacing property-based
urban governance with citizenship-based urban governance.
A. U.S. AND CHINESE LAND USE REGULATION: CONVERGENCE TOWARD
EXCLUSION?
As this Article reveals, the political systems in both the U.S. and
China have imposed limits on high-density development. To an American
visiting China, the claim that the country’s cities are “anti-density” may
seem odd. After all, Chinese cities have many more high-rise apartments
than American cities. And unlike in the U.S., it is true that the predominant
living style in Chinese urban culture is apartment-dwelling, often in large
buildings. However, as we have demonstrated herein, Chinese local
governments often thwart the even-higher-density developments for which
there is considerable demand. The fact that land sales account for a
significant portion of local government budgets pushes those governments
to transform additional rural land into developable residential areas instead
of focusing their efforts on increasing the development of already-built-up
areas, leading to the rapid sprawl seen in many cities. In the U.S.,
opposition to density is the fundamental position of most homeowners, as
we have seen in the New York City cases. Historically, such opposition—a
cause of deconcentration, or sprawl—has been less important than
suburban opposition to development. However, should urban homeowner
opposition continue apace, we can expect increased demand for new
developments in exurban areas.
High on the list of reasons for opposing density in both the U.S. and
China is concern for the additional infrastructure costs that density
imposes. Concerns over overcrowding in schools, parks, and other public
facilities, as well as over the potentially high costs of improving and
expanding infrastructure, generate public opposition and government
237.

See id.
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obstruction to new development in both countries. In addition, explicit and
implicit fears over income mixing have also shaped opposition to higherdensity housing. In the U.S., “snob zoning” is an old phenomenon. In fact,
land use regulation in the West—from Euclid onwards—has been based in
large part on the principle of separation of income levels. In China, this is a
rather new phenomenon, but, as we have seen, exclusionary communities
are becoming prevalent in the country’s largest cities.
Housing markets in China and the U.S., albeit different in many ways,
are exhibiting signs of convergence. This Article has focused on the
housing debate in both countries’ fast-growing cities, but such “weak
market” cities as Ordos and Qinzhou in China238 and Detroit and St. Louis
in the U.S. feature a glut of affordable housing. In the U.S., that glut is the
result of demographic changes in these and similar cities. People have
moved in search of better economic opportunities, leaving their housing
behind. In China, such oversupply is the result of poorly planned
construction projects that were not based on market demand.
Despite dramatically different fundamental frameworks, the U.S. and
China are also converging toward the same exclusionary results. In China,
control of land use decisions remains concentrated in local government
hands. Although real estate developers have some influence, government
leaders make the decisions about what gets built and where. In the U.S.,
government regulators, private property owners, and developers vie for
power in both short-term disputes over individual projects and long-term
debates over the appropriate level of construction. Although governments
in the U.S. have the power to reject proposals, and therefore shape
development, they do not generally plan and/or initiate housing
developments. However, even with concentrated power in China and
dispersed power in the U.S., the end result in the megacities of both is a
decision to limit growth.
Additionally, in the U.S., public participation is a fundamental aspect
of the development process. New York City is a typical example. Its
property owners and their representative organizations wield significant
power in shaping both the general zoning map and decision-making about
individual development projects. In China, public participation is limited,
and has historically been directed toward input on general plans. However,

238. 中国或现 50 个“鬼城” 三亚威海排前十 [China’s 50 “Ghost Cities;” Sanya and Weihai
Rank in the Top 10], CAIXIN (Oct. 14, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://m.datanews.caixin.com/m/2014-1014/100738050.html.
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the situation is changing, with public opposition to development seemingly
on the rise.
Finally, the types of markets and goals of government decisionmakers certainly differ in the two countries. In China, industrial
development often takes priority over residential development. In the U.S.,
opposition to residential development is strong among residents and
government officials because of concerns over the costs of increased
density. Industrial development is less of a priority in American cities,
which are generally older, with existing (and underutilized) industrial areas
already in place. However, in both countries the fundamental structure of
the property system is based almost exclusively on the interests of current
property owners. In China, much of the land remains owned by the
government. The transfer of land to private parties has brought about new
development, but not enough to meet demand. In the U.S., private land
ownership is the norm, but private property owners’ incentives to limit
competition for resources and to maintain property values point toward
exclusion. Our research leads us to conclude that more equitable land use
regulatory regimes require the conscious inclusion of non-property owners
in the planning and development process. Neither a public nor a private
system that places power solely in the hands of property owners will ever
produce the necessary amount of housing.
B. TOWARD A NEW, INCLUSIONARY REGULATORY SYSTEM
The value of cities, according to agglomeration economics, is that they
are able to share information, talent, public transportation, education,
healthcare systems, and other public goods. Sharing and more inclusive
cities are more efficient than exclusionary cities, as they ensure that
developments benefit from the greater availability of human capital,
governments benefit from more taxes, and citizens (both old and new)
benefit from more information, communication, services, and
opportunities. That is how cities have grown over time and why we
consider them the greatest invention of civilization. 239 Recognizing the
importance of cities to human development, people also share a vision of
“cities for all,” to be achieved, as the U.N. General Assembly resolved, “by
leveraging the agglomeration benefits of well-planned urbanization, high
productivity, competitiveness and innovation, by promoting full and
productive employment and decent work for all, [and] by ensuring the

239.

GLAESER, supra note 4, at 6.
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creation of decent jobs and equal access for all to economic and productive
resources and opportunities.”240 Fundamental to the core of inclusive cities,
of course, is “a variety of adequate housing options.”241
However, as exemplified by the comparative study reported herein,
vested interests in both American and Chinese megacities have accelerated
their exclusionary tendencies. To address the failure of the political markets
regarding land use regulations in megacities, we can either abolish zoning
altogether 242 or empower non-property owners in the decision-making
process of zoning. Abolishment of zoning would theoretically enable
landowners to “develop their property in the manner they desire[].”243 But
the question is whether landowners desire the same amount of housing as
do potential consumers—in particular the middle- and lower-end
consumers. As discussed previously, this is not necessarily the case.
Moreover, the expansion of government in Chinese and American
metropolitan areas has rendered this solution very difficult, if not entirely
infeasible. The other approach—empowering those whose interests are not
protected by the current system—is thus more practical. Land use
regulations have become more necessary than they were a century ago
because of interconnectedness and the agglomeration of economic and
social activities in cities. However, that does not preclude the possibility of
redefining the boundaries of the political market of urban governance. A
more balanced approach may be to facilitate equal access and participation
in the political market by creating neighborhood plans that set general
parameters for development while leaving individual development
decisions to individual property owners, supplemented by private remedies.
The essential component of this approach is to clearly define the
boundaries of the political market and the entitlements of its participants.
Urban governance regimes are shaped by city politics, increasingly
dominated by private owners in the U.S. and by public ones in China.
There are few meaningful mechanisms to welcome newcomers,
traditionally the primary source of cities’ greatness. These problems cannot
be resolved solely by technical revisions of democratic procedures; they
can be resolved only by changing the composition of political
representation. Newcomers to cities must be afforded more power to shape

240. G.A. RES 71/256, ¶14(b) (Dec. 23, 2016).
241. Id. at ¶ 33.
242. Ellickson, supra note 93, at 705–11; Ilya Somin, The Emerging Cross-Ideological Consensus
on Zoning, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2005), https://wapo.st/1Ny1U4C; Glaeser, supra note 9.
243. Glaeser et al., supra note 234, at 367.
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land use regulations. Changing the number and composition of participants
could well reshape the urban governance landscape. Empowering absent
stakeholders is of more fundamental importance than effecting technical
amendments to land use procedures and regulations. Zoning budgets and
city-level discussions can improve the situation by limiting the influence of
local community opposition, but they will not shift the city dynamics from
pro status quo to pro housing development.
In his celebrated article, Suburban Growth Controls, Ellickson
addresses how to protect housing consumers against monopoly pricing.244
His proposal is to grant housing consumers legal rights: more specifically,
an entitlement to initiate antitrust class actions, using the threat of damages
to deter housing owners from exercising monopoly control over zoning.245
In the spirit of incorporating housing consumers into the bargaining
process, we propose to restructure the political market for urban
governance to bring housing consumers into the political market, and to
entitle them to participate in zoning decisions. Doing so would mean
changing the current tripartite urban planning framework to a four-party
framework.
In future work, we plan to develop a way to incorporate non-property
owners into the political system.246 However, we suggest several first steps.
In essence, urban governance regimes must give non-property owners and
their representatives, as well as NGOs that build and advocate for
affordable housing, a substantive voice and power in the process of
deciding overall land uses and urban development densities. For example,
governments in both China and the U.S. could consider establishing
community involvement commissions at the city level to formally represent
low-income populations, homeless residents, and renters in the urban
planning process.247
Empirical studies have revealed that exit cannot replace voice in
shaping policy change.248 Meltzer and Schuetz’s analysis of policy changes
in 100 Bay Area cities and towns between 1998 and 2003 reveals that

244. See Ellickson, supra note 37, at 437.
245. Id.
246. See Wendell E. Pritchett, The Curious Tale of Public Participation in American Land Use
Decisions (Mar. 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
247. For a real-world practice, see Erica C. Barnett, How Seattle Is Dismantling a NIMBY Power
Structure, NEXT CITY (Apr. 3, 2017), https://nextcity.org/features/view/seattle-nimbys-neighborhoodplanning-decisions.
248. See James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 259–78 (1991).
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“political factors, such as partisan affiliation and the strength of affordable
housing nonprofits, are more robust predictors [than economic and spatial
factors] of whether or not a local government adopts inclusionary
zoning.”249 In other policy areas, such as environmental protection, we also
see the importance of political participation. Portney and Berry’s survey of
city councilors and administrators in fifty large American cities shows that
“contact with different group sectors and degree of inclusiveness of those
sectors in policymaking is linked to policymakers’ support for
environmental protection and for sustainability.”250 Successful urban policy
changes are shaped much more by advocacy and participation than by
choosing to leave. Therefore, the next step is to figure out a plan for giving
housing consumers equal access to decision-making in land use control and
urban governance.
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